



A critical appraisal on the execution and resolution of the Macedonian wars

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Abstract

This paper provides a critical appraisal of the concepts of execution and resolution of the Macedonian Wars within the context of conflict resolution. As such, the framework of my analysis is based on the concepts and principles of execution and resolution; why it is studied, and how it is studied. The Macedonian Wars from the periods (214 - 148 BC) was a series of conflicts between the Roman Republic and her Greek allies against numerous Greek kingdoms. The several phases of the war include the first Macedonian war, the second Macedonian war, the third Macedonian war, the fourth Macedonian war, and the Roman-Seleucid war. This paper will also adopt the use of the classical ideas of conflict management to address impulsions that stimulated these wars and the models established for the attainment of peace.

Keywords: Execution, resolution, wars, Macedonia, peace

Introduction

While there exists multiple explanations and interpretations of the term "Execution" for this research, execution involves the implementation of a stratagem as regards the entire mode of operation. The procedures are set in motion for the implementation of an idea situated in its course of action. The resolution, on the other hand, is the quality of being resolute. In the discipline of Conflict Studies, the term resolution holds legal significance. It concerns how two or more parties are able to reach a consensus on varying issues. For clarity, it is pivotal to establish a workable definition of the term conflict resolution since the word conflict is often used in ambiguous contexts. Conflict and competition are entirely two different concepts; while some may interpret them to be somewhat synonymous, they are not. Competition is the use of exerting a set of guidelines that define the correlation between rivals as they engage in a series of actions to the end that they might achieve projected goals. Conflict is the condition that involves at least two parties, who share a mutual problem of position or resource scarcity that produces a consequential behavior such as (a threat) that is then designed through the exercise of power or force in an attempt to gain and control at the expense of others. (Steele, 1976) ^[14].

According to John Burton, it is essential to set down, step by step, the procedures that seem to be required in resolution - he posits that the nature of conflict determines the approach that would be adopted for resolution. For instance, the steps taken to resolve conflict by judicial processes are different from those taken to resolve conflict through conciliation and mediation (Burton, 1972) ^[1].

Herbert C. Kelman believes that resolution can only be accomplished through sustainability; this in turn can only be achieved through compliance, identification, and internalization which are the three processes of attitude change. Attitude changes are of immense value in state relations, politics, and international affairs. People may observe changes in opinion towards certain international issues - be it foreign policy, conflict, arms race, or disarmament. For conflict resolution to be absolute and lasting, the implications that we draw from these changes will depend on their depth and on the psychological meanings that can be assigned to them.

According to John Davidson and Christine Wood in their article titled "A Conflict Resolution Model", they state that the conflict resolution model is made of four main stages which are:

- Developing expectations for win-win solutions.
- Brainstorming creative options.
- Combining options into win-win solutions.
- Developing the best alternative to be negotiated.

In their opinion, the CRM (Conflict Resolution Model) differs from other approaches in avoiding explicit reference to objective criteria or principles of fairness (Davidson, Wood: 2004) ^[5].

Existing literature on conflict resolution and strategy, particularly the role of third party intervention in third-party intervention, has been designed to achieve peace from a historical and legalistic approach, providing explanations of examples and scenarios of international conflicts influenced by key actors often emphasizing their distinctive attributes (Hill, 1982) ^[10].

As opposed to Hill's perspective, Fisher believes in the philosophy of third-party consultation. According to him, conflict in its many forms is an omnipresent fact to human existence. Since it often includes dysfunctional and destructive components, soliciting a third party helps maintain value neutrality by bringing unbiased recommendations to conflict resolution (Fisher, 1972) ^[8].

Literature Review

The first Macedonian war (214-205 BC)

The first Macedonian War was primarily the war between Rome and Macedonia. The Macedonian Kingdom was also known as the Antigonids dynasty. The formative process of the first Macedonian War could be traced to as far back as the second Punic war where Carthage fought Rome. Here, the Carthaginian general in person of "Hannibal Barca" was innovative in his military endeavors. As Hoyos rightly states in his 1983 article titled "Hannibal: What Kind of Genius?" An example of strategic daring and skill was his decision to attack Italy from the inception of the war. He came close to bringing down Roman power, a near-miss for which his Roman contemporaries never forgave him, while their descendants accorded him grudging respect or even admiration (Hoyos, 1983) ^[12].

Hannibal had successfully crossed the Alps to invade Italy where he defeated one Roman field army at the Trebia river. In June of 217, he crushed yet another at Lake Trasimene Etruria (Ikroria).

Upon hearing of Roman defeats, Philip V now began to consider expansion in the West at the expense of a dying Roman Republic. This new direction was encouraged by Demetrius of Pharos who, after being expelled from his Adriatic dominion by Rome, was now of the opinion that Philip ended the social war prior to his attack on Italy, after he had gained the Illyrian coast. After which he accepted the state of affairs by ending the ceaseless war in Greece at Naupactus. The decisive Roman defeat at Cannae in 216 BC by Hannibal prompted Philip to send envoys to Hannibal asking for a formal alliance, in an attempt to make gains at the Roman expense. Sequel to the conclusion of the Punic-Macedonian treaty. Philip agreed further with new attacks against coastal Illyria, attacking Corcyra in 215. Subsequently, Philip's alliance with Hannibal prompted the Senate to dispatch Praetor with forces across the Adriatic.

Roman Maniples were aided by allies from the Aetolian League and Pergamon after 211 BC which did little more than seize minor territories across the Adriatic coastline in an attempt to combat piracy. This conflict between Rome and Macedonia was for the most part independent of the Roman - Macedonian Wars that followed which ultimately led to the Second Macedonian War. Philip's alliance with Hannibal was for the most part instrumental as it defined the trajectory of the war. Hannibal's use of Elephants was quite ingenious. Although the dynamic approach of how elephants could be used in combat originated from him, it would not suffice in his attempt to defeat Rome. Edwards suggests that irrespective of Hannibal's military shortcomings, he deserves credit for making do with the limited resources at his disposal at the time even though, during the period of 202 B.C.E in Zama, Hannibal's defeat was poised by the machinations of the frontal elephant assault which boomeranged, ultimately aiding the Roman cause (Charles, Rhodan, 2007) ^[2]. After the end of an indeterminate war of such magnitude in 205 B.C, the Phoenix was then drafted. The content thereof would define the fate of Hannibal as well as the security of Rome's allies which ultimately led to the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War.

The second Macedonian war (200-196 BC)

The origin of the Second Macedonian War is hinged on three major events. First, the Eastern situation of 205-180 B.C.; Secondly the Athenian declaration of war, the Roman embassy, and the Athenian appeal to Rome in 200 B.C; thirdly the Roman declaration of war and the Senate's policy (McDonald, Walbank, 1937) ^[15].

One universally acceptable view on the cause of the clash was King Philip's aggressive endeavors. Two definitive components determined the Roman frame of mind in regards to Macedonia before the inception of the second Macedonian war. The desire for military glory and strife for territorial gains. Polybius writing a generation later about this epoch stresses the importance of a triumph to a successful general as tangible evidence of his victory.

The inception of the Second Macedonian War led by Philip the V was inspired by Philip's intention to engage Macedonia's military prowess in hopes to change the course of history. The outcome of such experience was the trounce of Philip who was left with no choice but to leave high and dry his opulence in southern Greece and in Asia Minor.

Although the Romans declared Greek freedom against Macedonian rule, this ultimately increased Roman intervention in the affairs of the Eastern Mediterranean which eventually led to their conquest of the entire region. Sequel to the era of 230 B.C, the imperial vocation of the Seleucids were weakened. The Seleucid attempt to conquer Egypt was countered through a major mobilization campaign. In 205 BC, following the death of Ptolemy IV, he was then succeeded by the five-year-old Ptolemy V (but in reality, he was succeeded by his regents). Due to a high degree of internal instability between the North and South, the Macedonians allied with the Seleucids to conquer and divide Egypt between themselves. Amidst the series of these events, the only place to turn was Rome which made it all the more strenuous due to the relationship between the Greeks and Rome. An envoy from Pergamon and Rhodes brought evidence before the Roman Senate on the aggression pact signed by Philip V of Macedonia and Antiochus III of the Seleucid Empire. Although the details of the said treaty

remain unclear, as well as the exact reasons for Roman intervention, the Greek delegation was a success as Rome gave Philip an ultimatum to end his campaigns against Rome's new Greek allies. Philip declined and replied that the Romans ought to abide by the Phoenician Treaty, stating that if they make war on him, he would not hesitate to defend himself (Jakob, Larsen, 1937) ^[13].

Due to Phillip's response, Rome escalated the conflict, sending armies of Roman and Greek allies to enforce Roman will, which is the defining moment of the Second Macedonian War. Subsequently, Phillip's troops had no choice but to conform to the Roman-Greek army. Titus Quinctius Flamininus led the Roman troops to the plain of Thessaly by 198 BC. By 197 BC, Philip was decisively defeated by the Romans at the battle of Cynoscephalae, he then resolved to peace talks. The end result of his diplomacy led to the Treaty of Tempea of which Philip was banned from any form of external interference outside his borders and was instructed to abdicate from his recent Greek conquests and endeavors. Greek and Roman diplomacy on the eve of the Second Macedonian War helped in the formative developmental process on the concept of diplomacy. Although diplomacy before the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War has often been discussed, there has not been any extended individual treatment of the subject since the chronology of the period was put on a firmer footing through serious consideration of the Roman calendar (Meadows, 1993) ^[17].

The roman-Seleucid war (192-188 BC)

In 192 BC, the war between the Actolian and the Achaean Leagues in Greece escalated into a brutal war between the Roman Republic and the Seleucid Empire over the control of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Roman-Seleucid war otherwise known as the War of Antiochus was a dispute between two alliances steered by the Roman republic and the Seleucid empire.

The conflict took place in Greece, the Aegean Sea in Asia minor. The conflict was a result of a cold-war that started in 196 B.C. Rome was victorious and the Treaty of Apamea came into play. Here, the Seleucids were forced to give up Asia Minor as it was handed over to Roman allies. In 192, Rome's treaty with Antiochus defined a settlement under which the King should relinquish his hereditary claims in North Eastern Greece and the Aegean. It also covered her allies Rhodes and Pergamum, along with the free Greek cities in Western Asia Minor, which held their place with Roman support (McDonald, 1969) ^[16].

The third Macedonian war (172 - 168 BC)

Upon the death of Philip (V) in Macedon in 179 BC, his son, Perseus of Macedon became ruler of Macedon. The trigger for the Third Macedonian war is less complicated than others. Perseus of Macedon was an expansionist and he sought to restore Macedon's international influence; as such, he began to move against his neighbors in a power-driven conquest. Soon after, Perseus of Macedon was implicated in an assassination plot against a Roman ally; which forced the hand of the Senate to outrightly declare war against Macedon, hence the Third Macedonian War. Perseus was married to Leia Dyke, the daughter of King Seleucus the Fourth Karen Aceveda which helped enlarge his army. At first, Perseus attained some minor successes, the war ended with the King's surrender to Roman General Lucius Aemilius Paullus after

his defeat in Pydna which led to his eventual imprisonment in Rome alongside his half-brother Philippus and son Alexander. On June 22nd, 168 B.C, after a series of maneuvers in the shadow of Mt. Olympos, Aemilius Paullus's consular army engaged and defeated the Macedonian army personally commanded by King Perseus on the broad plain near the port of Pydna. Perseus fled, but surrendered shortly afterward (Michael, Taylor, 2016) ^[18].

The fourth Macedonian war 150-148 BC

The man named "Andriscus" claimed to be the son of and heir of Perseus of Macedon and would become a major player in the Fourth Macedonian War. Andriscus found himself predisposed by the Romans at the end of the third Macedonian war in 168 B.C. His dream and vision for Macedon were to establish the old Macedonian Kingdom in its former glory and throughout, his endeavors merely destabilized Macedonia. even further. Although he encountered early success, his defeat came at the hands of Roman General Quintus Caius Elias at the second battle of Pitner in 148 BC. Two years later this defeat saw Macedonia become Roman Province. In the very words of Morgan "The first serious threat to the settlement of Macedonia carried out by the Romans in 167 had arisen only in 151-150, when the pretender to the throne of Macedon, Andriscus had begun to foment problems. Initially, he gained small support in Macedon. But in 149 B.C or, much later probably, in 148 B.C, the pretender managed to defeat a Roman Legion sent against him and successfully killed its commander, P. Iuventius Thalna. But in 149 or, much more probably, early 148 the pretender managed to defeat a Roman legion. Sent against him and to kill its commander, P. Inventius Thalna. Since both Consuls for 148 were engaged in other theaters, L. Piso Caesoninus in Africa and SP Postumius Albinus in Gaul, the task of retrieving the situation in Macedonia had to be entrusted to one of the praetors of that year, Q. Caecilius Metellus." (Morgan, 1969) ^[19].

The evaluation of the Fourth Macedonian War goes beyond the self-empowerment of the pretender Andriscus but more importantly, the idea of a Macedonian nation (Wilkinson, 1952) ^[20].

The Achaean leaders were originally against Andriscus' endeavors against Rome and deemed them hopeless as Rome had historically spoken, triumphed over stronger and larger opponents. The Fourth Macedonian War was the last of the Macedonian Wars to seriously threaten Roman control of Greece. The eve of the First Mithridatic War was poised by the dynastic rearrangements in Cappadocia (Dmitriev, 2006) ^[16].

Nearly after a Centennial period, the constant crisis management by Greece always led to intramural precariousness and war each time Rome ceased to interfere. Rome decided to divide Macedonia into two provinces, Achaea and Epirus. This development contributed to our general knowledge of the implications for our understanding of Roman Imperialism (Eberle, Le Quéré, 2017) ^[7].

The classical ideas of conflict management

The proponents of the classical ideas of conflict management are Thomas and Kilmann. They advocate the motion that conflict management can only be attained through a series of processes; when perfectly implemented, produces effective conflict management outcomes. These processes include;

1. Competition
2. Collaboration
3. Compromising
4. Avoiding
5. Accommodating

Competition: Competition primarily pertains to some degree of Contention and sometimes opposition for interest, dividend and profit. It therefore informs the narrative of people's actions to certain conditions and situations (Clark, 1925) ^[3].

Collaboration: Collaboration can be defined as contributions coordinated in a defined context, often in a group in an attempt to produce the desired result (Hyde, Linkvayer, Kanarinka, Mandiberg, Peirano, Tarka, Taylor, Toner, Zer-Aviv, 2012) ^[11].

Compromising: Compromise is an endeavor made for settlement to avoid further liabilities amongst all parties involved (Compromise and Settlement: What Constitutes, 1918) ^[4].

Avoiding: Avoiding is the strategy of sustainment and fiscal security whereby an individual, system, state, or entity refrain from any form of engagement with a rival or foe (Hendrix, 2015) ^[9].

Accommodating: Accommodating is a process of finding common grounds for cohabitation irrespective of existing ideological differences and perspectives.

Conclusion

The execution of the Macedonian Wars, like all other wars, was based on conquest. This sole factor influenced the various actions of Rome and the Greek kingdoms during these conflicts.

Resolution is studied so as to harness the various reliable and tenable principles that ensure Safety and ultimately the Sustainability of peace.

It is studied through the application of lessons gained from major historical events such as the Macedonian Wars. The classical ideas of conflict management create provisions as to how conflicts can be resolved irrespective of its scale.

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