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Kzp's Success and Failure Through the Syria-Libya Interventions: A Comparative Analysis

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Abstract

This study evaluates the activity of the Collective Compelling Policy (KZP) through Syrian and Libya interventions. In the study, intervention processes in two cases; Pre-intervention conditions were examined in terms of the strategic objectives of international actors, military and diplomatic methods applied and the sustainability of the results. Using the qualitative comparative analysis method, official documents, international establishment reports, academic studies and data obtained from media sources were analyzed. The findings reveal that despite the rapid results in Libya intervention, long-term stability cannot be achieved, and in Syria, it has failed to achieve the goals of the KZP. In both cases, international legitimacy, the conflicts of interest of regional actors and the inconsistencies in implementation strategies have come to the forefront as the main factors that limit the success of the KZP. The study offers preventive diplomacy, multilateral coordination and flexible strategic planning suggestions in order to apply more effectively in the future.

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Keywords: Collective Compelling Policy, Syrian intervention, Libya intervention, comparative analysis, international relations

1. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the form and scope of intervention policies in the international relations system has changed significantly. The acceleration of globalization, the direct impact of regional instability on international security and the increasing role of non-state actors have led the power projection to multidimensional strategies by removing only from being limited to military interventions. One of these strategies, the collective coercive policy (GRZP) refers to the pressure of pressure mechanism to change the behaviors of the target state by using military, diplomatic, economic and legal instruments in coordination of more than one state or international organization in international crises. The KZP theoretically is at the intersection of the "coercive diplomacy" and "multilateral intervention" approaches. It enables the international community to act jointly by combining unilateral pressure elements of coercive diplomacy on the basis of legitimacy of collective security systems. However, in practice, the success of this strategy, the harmony of the coalition, the basis of legitimacy, integrated use of the applied vehicles and the process of restructuring after intervention. This study examines Syria and Libya interventions comparatively in the context of KZP's dynamics of success and failure. The Libyan intervention has achieved the regime change in 2011 with the decision of the United Nations Security Council numbered 1973 and under the leadership of NATO under the leadership of NATO, but led to long-term instability. On the other hand, the Syrian intervention, complex actor structure, veto crises, multiple balance balances in the field and human disaster dimension has revealed the boundaries of the KZP. The main purpose of the study is to reveal the conditions under which the KZP can be effective through these two cases, in which cases failure and which courses can be learned for future international interventions. For this purpose, the study focuses on the following research questions:

How were the strategic goals and tools of KZP shaped in Syria and Libyan interventions?

What are the main factors that determine the level of success or failure of interventions?

What differences have occurred between the theoretical framework of KZP and the application results?

In the light of these questions, the study aims to make a theoretical contribution and to develop practical policy proposals. Thus, the role, boundaries and potential of the KZP in international intervention strategies will be evaluated with a more holistic perspective.

2. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

Collective Compelling Policy (KZP) is defined as the coordination of more than one state or international organization in international relations, by integrating military, economic, diplomatic and legal instruments to a certain behavioral change (George, 1991^[7]; Art & Cronin, 2003). The KZP aims to create a wider basis of legitimacy compared to unilateral compelling diplomacy, to share the cost of interventions among the participants and to establish an international norm-based printing mechanism. This approach is included in the intersection of compelling diplomacy and collective security concepts; In other words, both power projection and normative legitimacy are a hybrid strategy (Byman & Waxman, 2002)^[5]. In the theoretical framework, three main international relations approaches stand out in the examination of the KZP. The realist perspective center the strategies of use of power and power balance in order to maximize the interests of states. From this perspective, the goal converts the total power capacity of the coalition into a means of pressure against the target state; However, its success depends on the extent to which the interests of the coalition members overlap (Mearsheimer, 2001). The liberal institutionalist approach explains the effectiveness of the KZP with the coordination capacity of international institutions, decision-making processes and ability to produce legitimacy. Institutions such as the UN Security Council can increase the effectiveness of the collective movement by providing both legal and political support to KZP; However, veto mechanisms in decision-making processes may limit this activity (Keohane & Nye, 2011). The structuralist/constructivist approach evaluates the KZP in the context of the normative framework of the international community in the context of the identities and discourses of the actors. How the intervention is framed in the international public opinion directly affects the perception of legitimacy and coalition support (Wendt, 1999)^[20]. The success or failure of the KZP can be evaluated through certain criteria. These criteria include the level of realization of strategic objectives, the provision of international legitimacy, the coalition compliance, the establishment of sustainable stability after intervention and the minimization of humanitarian costs (Byman & Waxman, 2002; Thakur, 2013)^[5, 16]. For example, in the Libyan intervention, the strong legitimacy of the UN Security Council No. 1973 and the coordination conducted under the leadership of NATO provides to achieve goals in the short term; The veto crises in Syria, the fragmented coalition structure and the multi-actor structure in the field caused the KZP to be ineffective. This reveals that the KZP needs not only multi-sided, but also strategic harmony, normative framework and post-crisis planning.

3. Methodology

This study is based on qualitative comparative case analysis in order to examine the dynamics of the collective coercive policy (KZP) in Syria and Libya interventions. Comparative

case analysis enables the systematic examination of similar cases in different contexts and enables the presence of common patterns and differences (Yin, 2018)^[21]. In this context, Libya and Syrian interventions have been chosen as two critical cases that are suitable for comparison in terms of implementation and consequences of KZP. The Libyan case offers a KZP example that has been authorized on the basis of international law on the basis of international law by the United Nations Security Council No. 1973 and has achieved its strategic goals in the short term; The Syrian case constitutes an example of a failed practice due to great power competition, lack of legitimacy and coalition incompatibility. Multiple data sources were used in the data collection process. First of all, official documents such as the decisions of the United Nations Security Council, NATO operation reports, Arab League declarations and official statements of the states were examined. In addition, academic articles published in refereed journals, books and policy reports on the subject have been considered as secondary academic resources (George & Bennett, 2005)^[8]. In addition, journalism sources were scanned through the archives of international media organizations such as BBC, Reuters, Al Jazeera and The Guardian, and additional information about the chronology of the events and the discourses of the actors. The field reports published by non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and International Red Crossing Committee have been used especially in the determination of human effects. Thematic content analysis method was applied in the analysis process (Braun & Clarke, 2006)^[4]. First of all, the basic themes have been determined for both cases, pre-intervention conditions, strategic objectives, applied kzp tools, international ground of legitimacy, coalition structure and developments after intervention; Data are coded within the framework of these themes. After coding, comparison between cases were made and similarities, differences and cause-effect relationships were revealed. The evaluation criteria of the study were gathered under five headings: (1) The level of realization of strategic objectives, (2) Ensuring international legitimacy, (3) Compliance and coordination of the coalition, (4) Establishing sustainable stability, (5) Minimizing human costs. These criteria were used to evaluate both short and long-term effects of KZP (Byman & Waxman, 2002)^[5]. The research has some limitations. First of all, the analysis is limited to open source data and secondary literature, as there is no direct access to the field. In addition, there are current and verified data deficiencies in Syria due to ongoing conflict conditions. Finally, the fact that some diplomatic interviews and military operation details are not open to the public increases the risk of incomplete information in the analysis.

4. Syrian Intervention

Anti-government demonstrations that started in the city of Dera in south of Syria in March 2011 spread throughout the country in a short time with the regional influence of the Arab Spring. Initially, the protests, which started peacefully with the demands of democracy, political reform and economic justice, were rapidly turned into armed conflicts as a result of the use of Assad administration's harsh security measures and excessive use of force (Kadić, 2018)^[10]. The crisis became more complex with the deepening of ethnic and sectarian decompositions; The tension between the Sunni majority and the Nusayri minority has become the basis of regional

polarization and external interventions. The field has soon turned into a battlefield, including a large number of actors; Regime forces, different opposition fractions, radical organizations (such as ISIS and al-Nusra), Kurdish forces and regional-global state actors have emerged. In order to force the Assad regime to change behavior, the international community has introduced various tools within the framework of collective coercive policy. Western states such as the USA, France and the United Kingdom and regional powers such as Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Qatar provided financial, logistics and military support to opposition groups; It also put pressure against the regime on diplomatic platforms (Bowen, 2020) ^[3]. On the other hand, Russia and Iran have deployed direct military power to the field as the most powerful supporters of the Assad administration, gave militia support and prevented the international isolation of the regime by veto the binding decisions to be taken at the UN Security Council (Lenarz, 2014) ^[14]. The United Nations and the Arab League have attempted various peace plans and mediation in order to end the conflict; Negotiation processes have been initiated through special representatives such as Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi. However, in the UN Security Council, Russia and China's recurrent vetos prevented binding and effective decisions; This has seriously weakened the legitimacy and activity capacity of the KZP (Halliyade, 2016) ^[9]. Within the framework of KZP, the main instruments against Syria were economic sanctions, diplomatic insulation and limited military support. The US and the EU imposed comprehensive financial sanctions on regime leaders and its immediate surroundings; It has imposed restrictions on oil exports. Within the framework of diplomatic pressures, Syria was expelled from the Arab League; Condemnation decisions were taken at the UN General Assembly. However, the military balance in the field has returned in favor of the regime with the interventions of Russia and Iran; In 2015, Russia's direct air operations have significantly weakened the military power of the opposition. As a result, the Syrian intervention was in the literature as an unsuccessful example of the KZP. The main causes of this failure include internal target and method incompatibility, veto crises in the UN Security Council, lack of integration of military and diplomatic vehicles, and multi -actor complex structure in the field. The sanctions applied could not create the expected behavioral change on the regime; On the contrary, it has led to the displacement of millions of people by deepening the human crisis and the death of hundreds of thousands of civilians (Bowen, 2020) ^[3]. The Syrian case clearly demonstrates that the KZP may be neutralized not only by multi -sided, but also by international legitimacy, strategic harmony, post -crisis planning and minimization of humanitarian effects.

5. Libya Intervention

The People's uprising, which began in Libya in 2011, led to the rapid growth of the Arab Spring protests in Tunisia and Egypt and dragged the country into a civil war environment. The use of heavy weapons against civilians in regions where the opposition, especially Bingazi, has raised the danger of mass massacre in the regions where the opposition, especially Bingazi, has raised a strong reaction in the international community (Bellamy & Williams, 2011) ^[2]. This is the implementation of sanctions such as arms embargo, travel ban and assets such as ice cream with the decision of the United Nations Security Council dated 26 February 2011;

Then, with the decision no. 1973 adopted on March 17, 2011, it led to the declaration of a prohibited zone on Libya and the authorization of all necessary measures için for the protection of civilians (United Nations, 2011a, 2011b) ^[17]. This decision has been considered as one of the clearest examples of KZP on the basis of international law (Kuperman, 2013) ^[12]. Within the scope of the "Operation Unified Protector" plan under the leadership of NATO, the progress of the Gaddafi forces with intensive air bombings, maritime blockade and intelligence operations were stopped; The states with high military capacity such as the United States, France and the United Kingdom formed the main backbone of the operation (Chivvis, 2014) ^[6]. In the same period, the Arab League supported the decision of the prohibited region by supporting regional legitimacy to the intervention; The African Union called for a political solution, but cautiously approached military intervention. The short -term result of the intervention was the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in October 2011 and the elimination of the risk of civil massacre in the first stage. However, the decrease in the relief of the coalition in the post -intervention period caused the country to fall into the security gap and increase the conflicts between militia groups (Wehrey, 2014) ^[19]. This process has shown that KZP may be effective at the crisis, but long -term stability is only possible with extensive planning, local capacity construction and sustainable international support after intervention. The Libyan example offers important courses about how the international community should establish short -term success and long -term stability.

6. Comparative Analysis

Syrian and Libyan interventions are considered two important cases in terms of showing how the collective coercive policy (KZP) works in different political, legal and military contexts. The uprising, which began in 2011 in Libya, soon became an anti -regime armed rebellion and the risk of mass massacres against civilians had a wide repercussion in the international public. This resulted in the declaration of the United Nations Security Council numbered 1973 with the declaration of a prohibited zone and giving the authority to take "all necessary measures için to protect civilians (United Nations, 2011b) ^[17]. Thus, the Libyan intervention gained legitimacy on the basis of international law, and a rapid and coordinated operation was carried out under the leadership of high military capacity such as the USA, France and the United Kingdom under the leadership of NATO (Chivvis, 2014) ^[6]. Thanks to the integrated implementation of military operations, diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions, regime changes were achieved in the short term, but the decrease in the interest of coalition in the process of restructuring after the intervention led the country to political disintegration and militia conflicts (Wehrey, 2014) ^[19]. For this reason, the Libyan case shows that KZP may be effective in short -term targets, but sustainable strategies are required for long -term stability (Kupkerman, 2013). In Syria, the folk demonstrations that started in 2011 became a multi -actor and complex civil war due to sectarian and ethnic tensions (Kadić, 2018) ^[10]. The differences in target and methods between Western states, regional actors and opposition groups have prevented strategic harmony in the coalition; A binding international intervention decision was not taken due to the vetos of Russia and China at the UN Security Council (Halliyade, 2016) ^[9]. Despite economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures, the inability to activate

military vehicles effectively limited the success of the KZP (Bowen, 2020) ^[3]. The Assad regime has maintained its power thanks to the intense military and diplomatic support of Russia and Iran, and the human crisis deepened (Lenarz, 2014) ^[14]. This reveals that the success of the KZP is not only possible with multi-sided participation, but also to clearly defining common goals, integrated use of strategic tools and providing institutional legitimacy (Thakur, 2013) ^[16]. When evaluated comparatively, the Libyan intervention has achieved strategic goals in the short term, but causing instability in the long term; The Syrian intervention failed due to the lack of coordination of the international coalition and the weakness of legitimacy. The fast and coordinated intervention model in Libya proves that KZP may be effective in the event of crisis; Syrian experience has shown that great power competition and the multi-actor structure in the field can make the KZP dysfunctional. When these two cases are taken together, it is concluded that the KZP requires long-term engagement, corporate coordination and flexible strategic planning in the post-crisis period, not only at the time of the crisis, (Bellamy & Williams, 2011 ^[2]; Kupurman, 2015).

7. Kzp's Role And Effectiveness

Collective Compelling Policy (KZP) is defined as a strategy that forces the target state to change behavior through multilateral coordination in international crises and performs this with the combination of military, diplomatic, economic and legal instruments (Thakur, 2013) ^[16]. Syrian and Libya cases are two striking examples that reveal both the potential and structural limitations of the KZP. In Libya, the KZP was authorized on the basis of international law with the decision of the United Nations Security Council No. 1973; Air operations, economic sanctions and diplomatic insulation under the leadership of NATO have been integrated (United Nations, 2011b; Chivvis, 2014) ^[17, 18, 6]. This integrated approach quickly achieved the regime change and eliminated the risk of civil massacre. However, the decrease in coalition support during the restructuring process after the intervention and the weakness of local security institutions led Libya to long-term instability; This has shown that the KZP requires a sustainable engagement not only at the time of the crisis but also after the crisis (Wehrey, 2014 ^[19]; Kupkerman, 2015). In Syria, the applicability of KZP is seriously limited due to great power competition and institutional congestion. The constant vetors of Russia and China's Security Council prevented the emergence of binding decisions and weakened the ground of legitimacy (Halliyade, 2016) ^[9]. Target and method mismatch between Western states and regional actors prevented the integration of military and diplomatic vehicles in the field; Economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure could not have the expected effect on the regime (Bowen, 2020) ^[3]. This reveals that the success of the KZP depends not only on the principle of multi-sided, but also the strategic harmony of the coalition, the international legal authorization and the complementary use of the vehicles applied (Lenarz, 2014) ^[14]. When both cases are evaluated together, the four basic factors that determine the effectiveness of the KZP stand out: (1) The floor of legitimacy and authorization: As in Libya, when a clear authorization is achieved within the framework of international law, the applicability of the KZP increases. (2) Coalition Compliance and Capacity: Inter-actors target union and operational coordination enable the effective use of strategic tools. (3) Vehicle integration: The

coordination of military, diplomatic, economic and legal pressure tools increases the likelihood of success. (4) Strategy after the intervention: Short-term gains obtained without the mechanisms of restructuring and peace after the crisis can be lost in the long term (Bellamy & Williams, 2011; Thakur, 2013) ^[2, 16]. Therefore, the KZP should be designed not only a "crisis solving" tool, but also to be the corporate assurance of post-crisis stability.

8. Policy Recommendations And Future Perspective

The courses learned from Syria and Libya cases show that the pre-crisis preparation, crisis-enforcement-enforcement and crisis-restructuring stages in order to be effective in the collective coercive policy (KZP) require the design of the complementary, corporately coordinated whole. First, the architecture of legitimacy should be strengthened: the decision of the UN Security Council numbered 1973 in Libya forms the basis of the international law (United Nations, 2011b) ^[17], the vetolar coalition in Syria weakened the hand of the coalition (Halliyade, 2016) ^[9]. For this reason, when the security council in KZP designs in the future is blocked in the future, the mechanism of the General Assembly for the mechanism for peace and the complementary capabilities of regional organizations (Arab League, African Union, EU) should be systematized as secondary legitimacy channels; Decision-making processes should be accelerated with predefined thresholds and criteria (Bellamy & Williams, 2011 ^[2]; Thakur, 2013) ^[16]. Secondly, the tool-integrated strategy is essential: the synchronic of military pressure and diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions in Libya produced short-term results (Chivvis, 2014) ^[6]. In this context, in order to reduce indirect damages on civilians in the design of sanctions, targeted, reversible and criterion-bond packages should be preferred; Human exemptions should be secured by digital monitoring and financial transparency standards (Bowen, 2020) ^[3]. Thirdly, coalition management and objective compliance are critical: NATO leadership in Libya, while providing operational unity (Chivvis, 2014) ^[6], the coordination of target differences between regional and global actors in Syria (Lenarz, 2014) ^[14]. In the future, the "common target map" of the coalitions should be clarified with binding protocols before intervention; Multi-area (Multi-Domain) command structures should be included in areas such as information sharing, fighting disinformation and documenting war crimes. The reform of the post-crisis restructuring and security sector (SSR) is the sustainable success of the KZP. The Libyan experience showed that after the regime change, security gap, militia disintegration and institutional erosion chronic the instability (Wehrey, 2014 ^[19]; Kupkerman, 2015). Therefore, the simultaneous peace design approach should be adopted from the first day of the intervention; A multi-year, secured plan for transition justice, capacity construction of local governments, secure selection infrastructure, economic recovery and continuity of basic services should be put into operation. In terms of the future of R2P, the Libyan-Suriye duality requires equal practice, transparent target definition and open exit strategies to maintain the credibility of the doctrine (Thakur, 2013) ^[16]. In environments where great power competition is intensified, layer deterrence (eg automatic, limited and proportional response packages in red lines such as the use of chemical weapons) and flexible diplomacy (human ceasefire, local reconciliation tables that keep negotiation windows open) should be carried out

together. Finally, evidence-based monitoring-evaluation mechanisms should be established and regular impact assessments should be published for sanction effects, civil protection, displacement dynamics and local legitimacy indicators; Policy adjustment should be made according to the findings. In total, these suggestions aim to turn the KZP from being the pressure technique of the crisis moment, but to turn it into an integrated intervention frame based on legitimacy, coordination and sustainable peace architecture (Bellamy & Williams, 2011; Chivvis, 2014; Kupurman, 2015; Thakur, 2013) ^[2, 6, 16].

9. Conclusion

This study revealed to what extent the collective coercive policy (KZP) could be effective in the context of Syria and Libya interventions, under which conditions have failed, and what kind of courses these results provide for future practices. The analysis stated that Libyan intervention can achieve its goals in the short term thanks to strong international legitimacy, net strategic objectives and integration of military-diplomatic tools; However, it shows that it cannot provide long-term stability due to the weak restructuring process after the intervention (Chivvis, 2014; Wehrey, 2014) ^[6, 19]. In the Syrian intervention, the great power competition, the veto crises in the UN Security Council and the strategic incompatibility within the coalition significantly limited the effectiveness of the KZP; Economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures were insufficient in providing regime change or comprehensive behavior change (Halliyade, 2016; Bowen, 2020) ^[9, 31]. Both cases reveal that the success of the KZP depends not only on the pressure capacity of the crisis, but also on international legal authorization, coalition compliance, strategic vehicle integration and post-crisis sustainable peace construction processes (Bellamy & Williams, 2011; Thakur, 2013) ^[2, 16]. The Libyan experience is that the KZP may be effective in the short term; The Syrian experience shows that lack of legitimacy, strategic disintegration and great power competition can neutralize the KZP. Therefore, in order for the KZP to become a stronger crisis management instrument in the future, open target definitions should be made before the intervention, the basis of legitimacy should be guaranteed with international law, military and diplomatic elements should be used in coordination and the restructuring mechanisms after the intervention should be planned in advance. This assessment reveals that the potential of the KZP can only be revealed with a holistic strategy extending from the crisis after the crisis after crisis, and that it should be supported by early warning systems, sanction designs, local capacity construction and long-term financing mechanisms. Syria and Libya examples reveal both the strong and fragile aspects of the KZP and offer valuable lessons to shed light on future practices.

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