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Intelligence and security cooperation, facilitating and limiting factors

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Abstract

The article approaches intelligence and security cooperation using literature analysis and aims to identify the facilitating and limiting factors and to improve this process. It begins by defining the key concepts, by highlighting the need, benefits and the historical landmarks of cooperation. Next, it examines the cooperation relationship between influential and dependent states that become imperative given the major historical events, insufficient borders, the intelligence

organizations' impossibility to cover the world, the international security unpredictability and the strategic interests. It concludes that factors like: political stability, resources, communication infrastructure, similar national values and security interests, history, trust, focus, enabling intelligence sharing, professionalism, feedback, respect and equal treatment would facilitate this cooperation, while the absence of these factors would limit it.

Keywords: Intelligence security, Cooperation, Influential states, Dependent states, Facilitating factors, Limiting factor

Introduction


This article aims to identify the factors that facilitate and limit intelligence and security cooperation using as research method the literature analysis. In order to analyze intelligence and security cooperation, first we should clarify what is intelligence, what is security and national security, what is cooperation, why is needed, which are the benefits and what are the historical landmarks which facilitated intelligence and security cooperation.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) defines intelligence as being "*knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us*" (Johnson, 2017) ^[3]. This knowledge cannot be provided by a single intelligence organization in relation to the approximately 200 states and that requires cooperation, based on security objectives that are or should be common to all states. John Nomikos referred to a world "*where security is measured by knowledge and not only by numbers of tanks or aircrafts*" (Tuzuner, 2010, p. 28) ^[8].

The concept of *national security* refers to defending and protecting borders actions, fundamental institutions, the lives of citizens and property belonging to a state in relation to internal and external threats. These actions fall to specialized institutions, designated and authorized with attributions in this respect. Based on the reasoning that *if the borders of a state are defended, if the attributions of fundamental institutions are realized, if the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens are exercised and if the goods of a state are ensured*, we suppose that the other subsequent activities can be realized and subsequent measures can be respected. In this context, national security gains the value of a *central value* around which the other values revolve.

The concept of *cooperation* (Zaccor, 2005), in the field of intelligence and security, refers to the development of defense relations based on the promotion of security interests, the development of military self-defense capabilities of states involved in cooperation, the exchange of intelligence or access to infrastructure. Metaphorically speaking, cooperation acts as a *bridge* between states and as a *link* between military personnel in ensuring the security of other states. It is important to note that this cooperation activity is not a *guarantor* of any state security, but only a *tool* that can facilitate the achievement of security objectives.

Why is it needed? The need for intelligence and security cooperation can be deduced from the international security context. From the approach of monitoring the existing conflicts at global level, it resulted that "*the year 2021 started with almost 30 conflicts*" (Soare, 2021). They are located all over the world, from North America (Mexico) to South America (Venezuela), from Europe (Ukraine) to the Pacific Ocean (South and East China Sea, including states such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, North Korea or Myanmar), from Southwest Asia and the South Caucasus (Turkey, Nagorno-Karabakh) to North and Africa's *heart* (Libya, Egypt, Mali, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Sudan, Somalia), with the inclusion in the middle of the distance of Syria, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon or Palestine.



Source: <https://www.dreamstime.com/red-human-figure-network-weak-link-toxic-worker-security-threat-leader-leadership-skills-teamwork-talented-image176907119>, accessed on 02.07.2021

Fig 1



Source: <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/?category=us>, accessed on 07.07.2021.

Fig 2

To be needed is necessary, but not enough for everyone, so which are the benefits? The cooperation process in this field is based on the win-win principle and it can be seen that its benefits are clearly superior to non-cooperation. In this regard, Stephane Lefebvre (2003) in the article *The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation* identified three major benefits of this cooperation, classified into three areas: informational, budgetary and diplomatic, but not to mention the security which is the main beneficiary of this type of cooperation.

The informational benefits contribute to filling the existing gaps or to offering some advantages, the budgetary ones contribute to the reduction of costs and the diplomatic ones to compensate for the non-existent diplomatic relations, to which we can add cultural benefits due to the cultural and linguistic expertise specific to each state. Moreover, the author also mentioned a possible influence of intelligence on the level of national security policies of other states. Michael DeVine (2019), in addressing relations between the United States of America (USA) and foreign counterparts in the field of intelligence, identified among the benefits of cooperation: the warning function in case of attacks, the ability to expand the coverage area, the action of corroborating information sources, facilitating access to certain areas inaccessible to all and the possibility of having a reserve diplomatic channel with those states.

The historical landmarks of intelligence and security cooperation overlap with the major historical events that characterized the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, events during which security was transformed into insecurity, including: World War I, World War II, The Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While the First World War paved the way for formal and imperative cooperation in the field of intelligence and security, the Second World War benefited from these bases of cooperation and allowed the development of cooperation by giving the intelligence necessary in stopping the war and in ensuring victory. World War II thus facilitated the creation of institutions for cooperation in this field in Europe, such as The United Kingdom - United States of America Agreement (UKUSA Agreement, 1948) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949), which succeeded The Berne Club (1971), The Kilowatt Network (1991) or The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (1995).

The existence of two major ideologies during the Cold War, communist and democratic, influenced the cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States too, the states that promoted the two ideologies. On the one hand, it deepened the existing cooperation relations with some states, and on the other hand, other states were attracted in cooperation, which were forced in the new context to reconfigure their security system.

At the beginning of the 21st century, terrorism has had a transformative effect on intelligence activity, the field of national and international security and the process of internal and external cooperation. With the collapse of the Twin Towers in the US, we can say that confidence in security *has collapsed* too, but intelligence has regained its supremacy and as a result cooperation has become a priority again in these key areas of any society.

Richard Aldrich (2004) in the article *Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation* notes both in the European space and in Europe's relations with the USA, substantial progress in the field of cooperation after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. At the same time, the author notes the significant issues that remain at the fundamental level too, which have evolved with the expansion of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and which are facilitated on the one hand by the interconnection of states and on the other hand by the particularities of intelligence organizations that differ from one state to another.

The major events that characterized the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, which had a direct impact on the national security of the states involved and the international one and during which the fear of security was greater in relation to the will to cooperate, proved that intelligence and security cooperation it is not only preferable to non-cooperation, but absolutely necessary. These were marked by insecurity, mistrust, vulnerability and constraints, attributes that impacted and the cooperative relationship implicitly.

A major example in this regard is the intelligence cooperation relationship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) political leaders. It was marked by Joseph Stalin's distrust when intelligence was provided to the USSR by UK prime-minister Winston Churchill or US President Franklin Roosevelt, regarding Germany's attack on the USSR which was to take place on June 22, 1941. This distrust in this kind of intelligence made not only the national security of the

USSR vulnerable, but prolonged the duration of the Second World War, increased the number of casualties and the resulting damage. This example suggests not only that intelligence and security cooperation is absolutely necessary, but the fact that, in some cases, cooperation is not enough, trust and action become imperative too.

After clarifying the three fundamental concepts of this research approach and highlighting the need and benefits of cooperation in this field and identifying historical benchmarks, we further aim to analyze the relationship between intelligence and security cooperation between influential and dependent states.

Intelligence and security cooperation between influential and dependent states

Each historical event that closed a certain chapter of cooperation inevitably opened another chapter, each time with the intention of avoiding previous failures, of preventing the reliving and rewriting of the same chapter under a different name, with other actors involved, with similar or greater losses. History has shown that when cooperation ceased, when all channels of communication were closed, the avenues of conflict were opened, and ultimately the principles of force were used in order to achieve goals that were not achieved peacefully. In a circular and paradoxical way, at its end, the conflict also reaches the cooperation with the opposing parties in order to arrogate and legitimize what has been acquired. In other words, *the end of cooperation paves the way for conflict, while the end of conflict reopens the path of cooperation.*

Recent decades have shown that security risks extend easily, regardless of existing distances, security measures or drawn boundaries, boundaries which in turn have proved to be insufficient and which have indirectly communicated that they can not ensure the security of a state in relation to insecurity. An example of this is the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. If the threats cross borders, then by analogy we can say that *cooperation should follow the same path*, preferably before them. Starting from this limitation and considering that no intelligence organization can know everything and from all over the world, which is a vulnerability for national and international security, we can say that intelligence and security cooperation becomes more than an added value, it becomes *imperative for a safer world*. It should be borne in mind that this inability to know everything and from the whole world and the imperative of cooperation in this field generate security risks in this process, but they are diminished in relation to the risks arising from ignorance and non-cooperation. Although it is a win-win-win cooperation for intelligence organizations, for cooperation relations between states and for national and international security, the intelligence literature has shown that most intelligence organizations face inefficient cooperation in both internal and external.

Cooperation on intelligence and security must be viewed from two perspectives, it can unite the cooperating states and at the same time it can disintegrate those against which it cooperates. We can sum up that the international security environment is the sum of the security of all its member states, *an equation in which cooperation or non-cooperation is a variable that can stabilize or destabilize this calculation.* It is noticeable that the world is divided, according to certain military, economic, technological and innovative, political, social or cultural indicators into *influential states* and *states*

dependent on these influential states to ensure their security or evolution. Cooperation may take place at the level of these influential states on an equal footing, at the level of influential states with dependent states on positions of superiority and in exceptional situations requiring cooperation, on positions unrelated to the status of the states involved.

Over time, cooperation relations have been shaped by the evolutions of the international security environment or the strategic interests of each state. It should be noted that some influential states, such as the United States, Russia or China, cooperate in certain security, economic, political, educational or humanitarian contexts, but this does not stop them from forming cooperative relations in turn against these states with which they cooperate in other areas. Paradoxically, some communist states that have sided with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including Romania, more or less on their own initiative, are now NATO member states or United States strategic partners, while other states, such as Ukraine, are currently working to join NATO to distance themselves from Russia.

An example of a cooperative relationship between influential states is the relationship between the United States of America and the United Kingdom, formalized in 1946, which is based on much more than common security interests, it has a common history and similar values. Just as British Intelligence Organizations (1909) inspired and influenced the establishment of US intelligence organizations (CIA, 1947), the American organizations in turn were and still are a source of inspiration and influence for the development of other intelligence organizations, such as those in Germany or Israel, which explains from this perspective the cooperative relations with these states that have successfully passed the test of time and trust.

Another example of such cooperation is the relationship between Israel and the United States and the United Kingdom. Aharon Ze'evi Farkash (Tuzuner, 2010, p. 13) ^[8], former director of the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate, in the article *Building effective Counter-terrorism responses* explained the usefulness of Israel in the very good cooperation relationship with the two states and offered, for example, the different perspective that intelligence services from Israel offers it on the situation in the Middle East, having the territorial advantage of being part of the landscape and looking at things from the inside out.

As far as dependent states are concerned, they seek to compensate for their vulnerability by cooperating with influential states, while influential states are constantly confronted with maintaining this privileged position, which in turn requires intelligence and security cooperation. As a result, the most influential states in the world, namely the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom or Germany, become the most desirable actors in cooperation, given that they are involved in most regional conflicts, and not only in the field of intelligence and security, but also in other important areas.

Richard Weitz (2005), in the book *Revitalizing US-Russian Security Cooperation. Practical Measures*, started from the premise that *Russia and the United States are the most important states for many of the vital security issues* and took into account the fact that they have the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, that they are involved in the main regional conflicts, as well as their roles against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In order to revitalize security cooperation between the two states, the

author suggested that the focus of the two states should be on developing joint threat reduction programs, military dialogue in certain strategic areas, reciprocity and equality and limiting the repercussions of certain disputes in which they are involved.

For example, although India has its strategic positioning, economic potential and British organizational heritage, China which stands out for its military strength and discipline and economic indicator, and Pakistan which stands out for its nuclear weapons or intelligence organizations, are security risks against India. This security context imposes not only the need for intelligence, but more than that, it imposes the imperative of an ally at least as strong as the one that threatens it, an ally like the United States of America that becomes a security vector for India in relation to China or Pakistan.

Similarly, European countries feel the need for a security vector to ensure their security in relation to Russia, which is recognized for its expansionist tendencies and relies on NATO and strategic partnerships with the United States. In Asia, the states are threatened by China competing for first place in the top poles of power. Also in Asia, North Korea poses a threat to international security, meaning that the US is cooperating in these areas with Japan or South Korea. In the Middle East, the United States is cooperating with Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council member states in the vicinity of Iran to create a balance of power, given Iran's nuclear intentions.

The most influential states and intelligence organizations that hold military, political, technological and information supremacy would not, theoretically, need the intelligence and security assistance of states that cannot ensure their own security. However, such states may prove useful in practice through geographical, linguistic or cultural expertise in cases where influential states project their influence in certain states or strategic areas or when they are targeted by states that are positioned in the vicinity of those dependent states.

At the level of dependent states, geographical expertise proves its usefulness by knowing the territory, by operating easily and by identifying with the place, an aspect that does not create suspicions, as in the case of foreigners. Language expertise also facilitates intelligence in certain areas, along with knowledge of cultural values and easy adaptation to climatic conditions in areas such as the Middle East. In the example, Shlomo Shpiro noted that *"country-role specialization is often the <currency>> that small intelligence services offer in exchange for cooperation with much larger and better-equipped ones"* (Shpiro, 2001).

In essence, if the influential states cooperate with each other to ensure their supremacy, to achieve their security objectives and strategic interests in areas on the territory of other states, the security-dependent states cooperate in this area to compensate for their vulnerability and they can prove their usefulness by strategic positioning in relation to other states, by the resources held, by geographical, linguistic or cultural expertise. Next, the factors that facilitate or limit cooperation in this field will be analyzed, in order to improve this process.

Resulted facilitating and limiting factors of intelligence and security cooperation

As national and international security risks become more difficult to anticipate and combat, national and international security cooperation *should become a cause for concern*. Thus, the focus should be not only on identifying security risks, but also on communicating them and identifying factors

that facilitate and limit intelligence and security cooperation. Thus, in the research approach we aim to identify and analyze the factors that have the value of facilitating or limiting intelligence and security cooperation. While the political stability of the states involved in cooperation can facilitate this process, political instability has the capacity to reduce cooperation, just as common national values have the capacity to unite nations, compared to the different values that can constitute barriers to cooperation.

From the perspective of the past, the negative or positive history of two or more states can be a strong enough barrier to put security in second place or it can be a foundation of cooperation, but what can make the difference in approach is *how great the security fear is in relation to the willingness to cooperate* or other pride of leaders. Also, the existence or non-existence of cooperation channels in other areas may be an advantage or a disadvantage in the cooperation process in this area. From the perspective of the present and the future, the focus of the states involved in cooperation oriented towards meeting the security objectives and identifying the vulnerabilities of the cooperation and identifying solutions in this approach can facilitate the cooperation process compared to the lack of interest shown towards these objectives.

Michael DeVine (2019) indicates two facilitating factors that characterize cooperative relationships, namely mutual security interests and mutual trust. If similar security interests create favorable conditions for cooperation, high or low confidence influences the duration of cooperation. From the other perspective, different national security interests and policies limit cooperation in this area. For example, intelligence and security cooperation between democratic states and totalitarian regimes with the attributes of openness, transparency, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms or respect for the security of other states in an antonymous relationship with isolation, secrecy, systematic violation of these rights or expansion, proves to be difficult, if not impossible. The question arises how such a regime that does not respect its national values and its own citizens, could show respect for the representatives of other states or for international security?. A positive aspect can be found though in the increase of the interest and of the involvement of the states, that are positioned in the proximity of these regimes, shown in the cooperation activity to ensure their own security.

In order for intelligence and security cooperation to be possible, regardless of the forms of organization of the states involved, the resources held by these states are indispensable, without it would not be easy or possible to obtain intelligence. Another factor that can facilitate or limit intelligence and security cooperation is the geographical distance that, although physically separating states from each other, at the same time the cooperation activity can bring them closer, precisely to reduce this distance. An advantage in this respect is conferred by technological developments that currently have few barriers.

Thus, if there is a positive history, a focus on the national and international security environment, if there are mutual security interests and a minimum level of mutual trust is established, if the states involved in cooperation have resources to ensure their intelligence and the geographical distance is not limiting, then intelligence and security cooperation is in a favorable scenario for cooperation. Starting from this point, the cooperation activity can be facilitated or limited by factors, such as: communication

infrastructure, secret attribute of intelligence, legal limits or privacy policies existing in certain states.

In theory, this intelligence and security cooperation is indispensable and possible. In practice, the nature of intelligence activity imposes many restrictions on both obtaining and disseminating what has been obtained, and the existence of a communication infrastructure that ensures the secret attribute of shared intelligence becomes essential. The secret attribute that characterizes intelligence activity and organizations and that confers intelligence value can be seen as an added value, so necessary in the field of security and at the same time as an obstacle to cooperation. This obstacle context can be generated by this secret attribute that restricts the number of beneficiaries, by the fact that it requires a certain channel of communication and by involving a high degree of mutual trust. In essence, *the more sensitive the sharing of intelligence and the more difficult it proves to be in practice, the more necessary and valuable it becomes.*

Michael Hermann in his article *Understanding the UK-US Intelligence Partnership* addresses the history and characteristics of the traditional intelligence and security relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. The author notes the existence of a common approach to protecting the secret attribute of shared intelligence, to which we can add similar internationally security interests given that most historical events have placed them in the same alliance. The author also emphasized the distinctive importance of trust and noted that the permanence of this relationship led on the one hand to mutual obligations, but also to the creation of interpersonal relationships that had a facilitating role, calling Britain's contribution in this area: *an independent << second opinion >>* (Tuzuner, 2010, p. 18) ^[8] for the USA.

For example, this US-UK cooperation relationship has a positive history of cooperation, a focus on achieving national security goals, common security interests and a high degree of mutual trust. Both states also have resources in all areas of activity that facilitate the secure infrastructure and communication of intelligence, regardless of geographical distance, and present a common approach to protecting the secret attribute of shared intelligence.

Regarding the legal limits, some states face the difficulty of intelligence and security cooperation due to the limitations provided in the fundamental laws or in the form of government (monarchy or republic). If in the case of some republics, the laws and the form of government facilitate the cooperation, in the case of some monarchies, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the cooperation becomes centralized around the monarch. For example, the Saudi leader has absolute control over intelligence and security organizations, and therefore also over the cooperation process.

In the positive case where the secret attribute is protected and there are no legal limits or they are exceeded, the cooperation activity can be influenced by the professionalism of intelligence organizations, different interpretation of threats or different perspective of leaders on the international environment. As for the professionalism that characterizes or should characterize intelligence organizations and that can be the hallmark of success and failure, this was pointed out by Colonel Albert Zaccor (2005) ^[10] in the article *Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy* as a factor on which the quality and credibility of intelligence depends.

Regarding the different interpretation of threats, there are situations in which some states may interpret terrorism, for example, as a threat at the international level, but not at the national level, an interpretation that may diminish their motivation to cooperate in this field. It is noteworthy that the adoption of such an attitude on a large scale would facilitate the implementation of this terrorist threat, increase the responsibility of only some states and diminish their efforts in this regard. Also, the different perspective of some leaders on the international security environment may limit cooperation, in the sense that cooperation with a state, such as the United States, is unlikely if you do not agree with its foreign policy, inferences on the territory of other states or strategic interests in certain areas.

Tariq Parvez (Tuzuner, 2010) ^[8], former director of the Federal Investigation Agency of Pakistan, in his article *Building Transnational Responses to Transnational Terrorism*, suggested that the best way to change mindsets about intelligence cooperation at the international level is to start change at the national level, the relevance of his research deriving from expertise in the field. Based on this premise, the author identified the obstacles encountered in intelligence and security cooperation, namely: taking responsibility when there are several people involved, the level of trust, non-communication of feedback, the superiority of intelligence organizations, the degree of respect shown and the principle of equality and secrecy. With the exception of the level of trust and secrecy, the author adds the other factors that limit cooperation and adds in this way value to research in this area.

The author suggested that the existence of interpersonal relationships could provide the necessary degree of trust in sharing intelligence, providing feedback on the use or non-use of intelligence could positively or negatively influence future cooperation and that the elitism of intelligence organizations can diminish cooperation, while treating with respect and on equal positions of the parties involved in this process could improve it. In the end, the author suggested in order to improve cooperation in this field, so sensitive, but also indispensable at the same time, encouraging a sharing culture, the existence of a common system to help quantify intelligence credibility and training in this field, the latter suggestion having been based on the positive training experience that the state of Pakistan has benefited from US intelligence services.

In addition to the factors that facilitate or limit intelligence and security cooperation, the risks of this cooperation have been identified in the literature. Derek S. Reveron (2016) ^[5], in his approach to security cooperation, identified the risk posed by the nature of cooperation involving several states and actors involved and which, in the author's opinion, will lead to more failures than successes. Other resulting risks could be the communication of shared intelligence to unauthorized persons, the exposure of sources of intelligence, the acting on the basis of intelligence obtained through cooperation that may prove to be erroneous or misinformation used in order to achieve one's own goals. In the analysis of the risks of cooperation in this field, the risks of non-cooperation that may make national and international security vulnerable must also be taken into account.

Following the research, factors have been identified that have the value of facilitating or limiting intelligence and security cooperation, such as: political stability or instability, common or different national values, positive or negative history of

cooperating states or the existence or non-existence of channels of cooperation in other fields. Influence or limitation may also be the focus of the states involved in the cooperation, which may or may not be oriented towards the achievement of security objectives, security interests which may be similar or different, or the degree of confidence which may be high or low.

An influence or limitation can also be represented by the resources held by the states involved in the cooperation, by the geographical distance that can distance or bring states closer, by the communication infrastructure that can ensure or make it vulnerable the shared intelligence, by the secret attribute of intelligence that can limit the number of beneficiaries of cooperation, which involves a certain channel of communication and which involve a high degree of mutual trust, legal limits or existing privacy policies that may facilitate or restrict cooperation.

The research also showed professionalism as an attribute of intelligence quality and credibility, along with different interpretations of threats that may diminish the motivation to cooperate in this field and the different perspective of certain leaders on the international security environment that may limit cooperation. Last but not least, factors have been indicated that may constitute a barrier to cooperation, such as: taking responsibility when there are several people involved in this process, lack of feedback, attitude of superiority of certain intelligence organizations that may affect the degree respect shown to the other states involved in cooperation, as well as the principle of equality.

Regarding corporation's risks, on the one hand we can synthesize that the more states and actors involved in cooperation are, the more exposed the shared intelligence becomes, the more the cooperation process is used, the greater the risk of intelligence being communicated to unauthorized persons becomes and the more exposed the sources of obtaining intelligence are. On the other hand, we must be aware that the more the intelligence and security cooperation process is not being used or trusted, the more vulnerable the national and international security of states becomes.

Conclusions

Intelligence and security cooperation is *a tool* that can facilitate, but not guarantee, the achievement of the security objectives of the states involved when used and can make them vulnerable by not using. The benefits relate to the security, information, budgetary, diplomatic or cultural field. Major events that marked the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and reconfigured security architecture, along with borders that prove insufficient to expand security risks, the impossibility of intelligence organizations to cover the world, the unpredictability of the international security environment and the interests of influential states in certain strategic areas have demonstrated, over time, the imperative of intelligence and security cooperation between influential states and between influential and dependent states for which it is a security vector.

If the states involved in intelligence and security cooperation benefit from internal political stability, resources necessary to ensure their own security and a communication infrastructure that can ensure the secret attribute of shared intelligence, it presents similar national values and security interests, a positive history and other channels of cooperation, a high degree of trust, are oriented towards meeting security

objectives, have no legal restrictions on intelligence sharing, are characterized by professionalism, communicate feedback, show due respect to other states involved and treat them in positions equality, then we can fit into a favorable scenario for cooperation in this field. The absence of these factors may prove to be limiting in this process.

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