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     2026:7/3

International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Growth Evaluation

ISSN (Online): 2582-7138 | Open Access

Electoral System Reforms and Their Impact on Representation and Governance Under Sri Lanka’s Nineteenth Amendment

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Volume: 7 | Issue: 2 | Pages: 697-711

Subject: ElectoralReform

Country: Sri Lanka

DOI: https://doi.org/10.54660/IJMRGE.2026.7.2.697-711

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Abstract

Electoral system design has played a pivotal role in shaping Sri Lanka’s post-independence political trajectory, influencing the nature of representation, the structure of the party system and the quality of governance. This article critically examines the evolution and impact of electoral reforms associated with 19A. It traces the historical development of Sri Lanka’s electoral system, analyses the core features of the post-19A reform package—including the move towards a mixed-member proportional model, the capping of preferential votes, changes to local government electoral rules and the strengthening of the independent Election Commission—and evaluates their effects on political representation and governance. Particular attention is paid to parliamentary representation and party system change, the representation of ethnic and religious minorities, and the evolving position of women and youth in formal politics. Using evidence from the 2015 and 2020 parliamentary elections and the 2018 local government elections, the article assesses how institutional changes have altered patterns of competition, coalition formation and accountability. The analysis finds that the reforms have modestly improved the integrity and inclusiveness of elections, enhanced the visibility of local representatives and women councilors, and created stronger institutional checks through independent commissions. However, significant challenges remain, including political resistance and institutional inertia, legal and administrative complications, weak campaign finance regulation, and limited public understanding of complex mixed-member rules. Drawing on comparative experiences from other mixed-member and hybrid systems, the article concludes with policy recommendations aimed at consolidating and deepening the democratic gains initiated by the Nineteenth Amendment.

How to Cite This Article

Vishaka Suriyabandara, Vinsuka Kannangara (2026). Electoral System Reforms and Their Impact on Representation and Governance Under Sri Lanka’s Nineteenth Amendment . International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Growth Evaluation (IJMRGE), 7(2), 697-711. DOI: https://doi.org/10.54660/IJMRGE.2026.7.2.697-711

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  1. 3. 4. Cappingpreferentialvotesinparliamentaryelections Oneofthemostvisibleandcontroversialaspectsof Sri Voterscouldindicateuptothreepreferencesforcandidateswithinthelistofthepartyorgrouptheysupported. Whilethisarrangementaimedtogivevoterssomeinfluenceoverwhichindividualsentered Parliament, italsogeneratedintenseintra-partyrivalryanddroveupcampaigncosts(Aliff,2012; De Votta,2016\. Reformadvocatesarguedthatintensecompetitionforpreferencevotesencouragedpersonalizedcampaigning, clientelismand, insomeinstances, violence. Candidatesofthesamepartycompetedforvisibilitybyorganizinglargerallies, displayingextensivepostercampaignsand International Journalof Multidisciplinary Researchand Growth Evaluationwww. allmultidisciplinaryjournal. com701|Pagedistributingmaterialbenefits. Thesepracticesdistortedpolicydebatesandmadeitdifficultforpartiestodisciplinememberswhoengagedinunethicalorillegalconduct, becausetheyoftencommandedtheirownlocalizedvotebanks(Uyangoda,2015\. The Nineteenth Amendmentandsubsequentlegislativechangesrespondedbycappingandsimplifyingpreferentialvoting. Proposalsincludedreducingthenumberofpermissiblepreferencesoreventuallymovingtowardsclosedlistsinwhichtheorderofcandidateswouldbedeterminedbyparties, subjecttointernaldemocracyrulesandgenderquotas(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015; Gamage,2021\. Evenpartialreforms, suchasloweringthenumberofpreferentialvotesandlimitingcampaignmaterials, wereexpectedtoreduceinternalrivalriesandfinancialexcesses. Fromagovernanceperspective, cappingpreferentialvoteswasdesignedtoshiftthefocusofelectoralcompetitionawayfromindividualpersonalitiesandbacktowardspartyprogramsandpolicyplatforms. Italsocomplementedthemovetowardsmixed-memberrepresentation, becauseconstituencyraceswouldalreadyprovidevoterswithadirectsayoverspecificindividuals, reducingtheneedforcomplexpreferencemarkingonpartylists(Reynoldsetal.,2008\.3.
  2. 5. Localgovernmentelectoralreforms Localgovernmentelectionshaveoftenservedasalaboratoryforelectoralexperimentationin Sri Lanka. Evenbefore19A, therehadbeenattemptstoadjustlocalauthorityelectoralrulestoaddressconcernsaboutrepresentationandaccountability. However, theseeffortswerefragmentedandmarredbylegalandadministrativedelays. The Nineteenth Amendmentanditsassociatedlegislationsoughttoharmonizeandconsolidatethesereforms, particularlybyapplyingthemixed-membermodelmorefullyatthelocallevel(Gamage,2015; Welikala,2015\. Underthenewarrangements, asubstantialportionoflocalcouncilmembersareelectedfromsingle-memberorsmallmulti-memberwards, whiletheremainderarechosenfrompartyliststoensureoverallproportionality. Thismodelaimstoensurethatlocalcouncillorshavecleargeographicconstituencies, makingthemmorevisibleandaccountabletoresidents, whilestillallowingpartieswithsignificantoverallsupporttosecurerepresentationeveniftheydonotwinmanywardcontests(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015\. Animportantinnovationwastheintroductionofmandatorygenderquotasforlocalgovernmentbodies. Partiesarerequiredtonominateaminimumproportionofwomenontheirlists, andthe PRcomponenthasbeenusedtotopupnumberofwomenelectedtolocalcouncils, althoughchallengesremainregardingtheireffectiveparticipationandinfluence(Kodikara,2017\. Theselocalgovernmentreformsservedseveralpurposes. Substantively, theywereintendedtoimproveservicedelivery, responsivenessandinclusivenessatthegrassrootslevel. Institutionally, theyprovidedvaluableexperiencewiththepracticalitiesofmixed-memberelections, includingballotdesign, votereducationandresulttabulation, therebyinformingfutureadjustmentsatparliamentaryandprovinciallevels(Gamage,2021; Uyangoda,2015\.3.
  3. 6. Strengtheningtheindependenceandpowersofthe Election Commission Perhapsthemostfundamentalelectoralinnovationofthe Nineteenth Amendmentwasthere-establishmentandstrengtheningofthe Election Commission. Earlierattemptstodepoliticizeelectoraladministrationthroughthe Seventeenth Amendmenthadbeenunderminedbypoliticaldeadlock, asthe Constitutional Councilresponsibleforappointingcommissionerswasoftennotconstituted, allowingpresidentialdiscretiontoprevail(Edrisinha&Welikala,2008\.19 Aaddressedtheseweaknessesbyredesigningthe Constitutional Councilandgivingitamorerobustroleinrecommendingappointmentstothe Election Commissionandotherkeybodies. Membersofthe Commissionarenowappointedbywithrepresentationfrombothgovernmentandoppositionandfromcivilsociety. Thisprocedureismeanttoinsulatecommissionersfromdirectpartisancontrolandtoenhancepublicconfidenceintheirneutrality(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015; Welikala,2015\. Theamendmentalsoclarifiedand, insomeareas, expandedthepowersandfunctionsofthe Election Commission. Theseinclude: Supervisingthepreparationandrevisionofelectoralregisters. Issuingguidelinestopublicauthoritiesandmediaorganizationstoensurealevelplayingfieldduringelectionperiods. Monitoringtheuseofstateresourcesandtakingactionagainsttheirmisuseforpartisanpurposes. Requestingthedeploymentofpoliceandothersecuritypersonneltomaintainorderduringcampaignsandonpollingdays. Advisingonproposedchangestoelectorallawsandconstituencyboundaries. Byconstitutionalizingtheseresponsibilities,19 Asoughttoreducethescopeforexecutiveinterferenceinelectionsandtocreateaprofessional, rules-basedelectoraladministration. Observershavenotedthatthe Election Commissionhas, sinceitsestablishment, takenamoreassertivestanceinregulatingcampaignconduct, thoughitseffectivenessstilldependsonpoliticalwillandbroaderrespectfortheruleoflaw(Gamage,2021; Uyangoda,2015\. provisionsrepresentanattempttotacklebothstructuralproblemsinthedesignoftheelectoralsystemandinstitutionalproblemsinitsadministration. Themovetowardamixed-membermodel, thecappingofpreferentialvotes, thereformoflocalgovernmentelections, andtheempowermentofthe Election Commissioncollectivelyaimedtocreateamorerepresentative, accountableandpeacefuldemocraticprocess. Theextenttowhichtheseobjectiveshavebeenrealizedisexploredinsubsequentsectionsthroughananalysisofelectoraloutcomes, representationpatternsandgovernanceindicatorsaftertheintroductionof19A.
  4. 4. Impactson Political Representation Thereformsassociatedwiththe Nineteenth Amendmentsoughtnotonlytocorrectinstitutionalimbalancesbetweentheexecutiveandthelegislature, butalsotorecalibratethe International Journalof Multidisciplinary Researchand Growth Evaluationwww. allmultidisciplinaryjournal. com702|Pagewayinwhichcitizensandgroupsarerepresentedinthepoliticalsystem. Changestotheelectoralformula, constituencystructure, andelectionadministrationwereexpectedtoalterpatternsofpartycompetition, minorityinclusion, anddescriptiverepresentation. Thissectionanalysestheseeffectsinthreedomains: parliamentaryrepresentationandpartysystemchange, therepresentationofethnicandreligiousminorities, andtheparticipationofwomenandyoungpeople.4.
  5. 1. Parliamentaryrepresentationandpartysystemchange Oneofthecentralcritiquesofthepre-reformproportionalrepresentationsystemwasthatitfosteredanincreasinglyfragmentedandpersonalizedpartysystem. Largemulti-memberdistrictsandopen-listpreferentialvotingcreatedincentivesforcandidatestocultivateindividualvotebases, oftenincompetitionwithfellowpartymembers, ratherthantobuildcoherentprogrammaticplatforms(Aliff,2012; De Votta,2016\. Themixed-memberreformsintroducedafter19 Aparticularlyatlocallevelandasamodelforparliamentaryelectionsweredesignedtorebalancetheseincentivesbyre-establishingsingle-memberconstituencieswhileretai-for Policy Alternatives,2015; Gamage,2021\. Fromamechanicalperspective, reintroducingconstituencyseatsenhancesthechancesthatthelargestpartieswillwindistrictsoutright, potentiallymagnifyingdisproportionalityintheirfavour. However, thecompensatorylisttierandnational-listallocationssoftenthiseffectandhelppreserveabroadlyproportionaldistributionofseats, especiallyformedium-sizedpartiesthatarecompetitiveacrossmultipledistrictsbutrarelydominantinanysingleone(Reynolds, Reilly,&Ellis,2008\basedonrecentelectoralresultssuggestthatamixed-membersystemwouldstillproducecoalitionpolitics, butwithsomewhatclearerlinesofaccountability, asvoterscouldpreferenceforapartyatthenationallevel(Gamage,2021; Welikala,2015\. Behaviorally, thenewarrangementswereexpectedtoreduceintra-partycompetitiondrivenbypreferentialvoting. Bycappingoreventuallyeliminatingmultiplepreferencemarksonpartylists, andbyshiftingmuchofthepersonalizedcompetitionintosingle-memberconstituencyraces, thereformsaimedtochangehowcandidatescampaignandhowpartiesmanageinternalrivalries(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015\. Constituencycontestsencouragecandidatestoappealtoaterritoriallydefinedelectorate, whilelistseatsallocatedcentrallyrewardpartiesthatmaintainnationalordistrict-wideappeal. Evidencefrompost-reformlocalgovernmentelectionsindicatesamodestdeclineinovertintra-partyviolenceandagreateremphasisonpartylabelsratherthanindividualpersonalities, althoughpatronagenetworksremaininfluentialinmanyareas(Kodikara,2017; Uyangoda,2015\. Thestructureofthepartysystemisalsoaffectedbythresholdsanddistrictmagnitudes. Undertheearliernationwide PRsystem, relativelyloweffectivethresholdsencouragedtheproliferationofsmallparties, someofwhichservedassatelliteorganizationsalliedtolargerparties. Mixed-memberarrangementswithsmallerconstituenciescanraisethebarrierstoentryforsuchpartiesinconstituencyraces, whilestillallowingthemtowinlistseatsiftheyattainsufficientoverallsupport(Reynoldsetal.,2008\. In Sri Lanka, thishastendedtofavourpartieswithstrongterritorialbasessuchasregionallyconcentratedethnicpartieswhilemakingitmoredifficultforhighlylocalizedfactionstosurviveindependently. Atthesametime, thebargainingpowerofmid-sizedpartiesincoalitionformationmayincrease, becausetheycanbepivotalinsecuringparliamentarymajoritiesevenwhenthelargestpartywinsmanyconstituencyseats(De Votta,2016; Welikala,2015\[9,. Anotherimportantdimensionisthequalityofparliamentaryrepresentation. Proponentsofthereformsarguedthatrevivingconstituencytieswouldmake MPsmoreresponsivetolocalneedsandmoreaccessibletocitizens, counteractingperceptionsofremotenessassociatedwithlargeelectoraldistricts(Manor,1989; Uyangoda,2015\. Initialobservationsfrommixed-memberlocalcouncilssuggestthatresidentsarebetterabletoidentifycouncillorsresponsiblefortheirwardandtodirectcomplaintsandservicerequestsaccordingly. Whetherthispatternwillbereplicatedatparliamentaryleveldependsonhowconstituencyboundariesaredrawnandhoweffectively MPsbalancelocalserviceroleswithnationallegislativeresponsibilities. Overall, thereformslinkedto19 Aappeartohavenudgedthepartysystemawayfromtheextremepersonalizationandfragmentationassociatedwiththeoldpreferential-vote-driven PRmodel, whilepreservingasubstantialdegreeofproportionalityandmultipartycompetition. Thelong-termimpactonpartyinstitutionalizationandprogrammaticpolitics, however, remainscontingentonbroaderenvironment(De Votta,2016; Uyangoda,2015\.(Continuesendingifyouwanttheremainingsectionsformattedthesameway.\4.
  6. 2. Representationofethnicandreligiousminoritieslightofitsimplicationsforethnicandreligiousrepresentation. Theshiftfrom FPTPto PRin1978wasjustifiedpartlyonthegroundsthatitwouldenableminoritypartiestosecureparliamentaryseatsmorecommensuratewiththeirvoteshare(Edrisinha&Welikala,2008; Nohlen,2005\. Inpractice, Tamiland Muslimpartiesdidgainimproveddescriptiverepresentationunder PR, yettheyoftenlackedeffectiveleverageinthepolicyarena, particularlywhendominantpartiesachievedlargemajorities(De Votta,2004\. Themixed-membermodeldevelopedinthewakeof19 Asoughttoretaintheserepresentationalgainswhileaddressingothershortcomings. Theuseofproportionallistseatsensuresthatethnicandreligiousminoritiesthatarenationallyorprovinciallydispersedcanstillachieverepresentationeveniftheydonotwinmanyconstituencyraces(Reynoldsetal.,2008\. Atthesametime, thereintroductionofsmallerconstituenciescanbenefitregionallyconcentratedminorities, suchas Sri Lankan Tamilsinthe Northernand Eastern Provincesorcertain Muslimcommunities, byallowingthemtoelectcandidatesdirectlyaccountabletolocalvoters(Goodhand, Klem,&S?rb?,2011\. However, theimpactofthesereformsonminorityrepresentationisnotautomatic; itdependsondelimitation, partystrategiesandcoalitiondynamics. Ifconstituencyboundariesaredrawninwaysthatfragmentminoritypopulationsacrossmultipledistricts, theirabilitytowin International Journalof Multidisciplinary Researchand Growth Evaluationwww. allmultidisciplinaryjournal. com703|Pageconstituencyseatsmaybedilutedaphenomenonknownas. Theroleoftheindependent Delimitation Commissionand Election Commission, strengthenedunder19A, isthereforecrucialinensuringthatboundariesarecraftedaccordingtoobjectivecriteriaratherthanpartisanorethnicmanipulation(Welikala,2015\. Partybehaviourisequallysignificant. Majoritarianpartiesmaychoosetofieldminoritycandidatesinwinnableconstituenciesortoallocatethemprominentpositionsonpartylists, therebyintegratingminorityconcernswithinbroaderpartyplatforms. Alternatively, theymayrelyonallianceswithminoritypartiesthatretaindistinctorganizationalidentities. Post-reformlocalgovernmentelectionshaveshownbothpatterns: insomeareas, minoritypartieshaveperformedstronglyunderthemixedsystem, whileinothers, minoritycandidateshavebeenincorporatedintomainstreampartylists(Kodikara,2017\. Theseexperiencessuggestthattheinstitutionalframeworkcreatedafter19 Aoffersmultipleroutestorepresentation, thoughthesubstantiveresponsivenessofelectedofficialstominorityinterestsstillvaries. Anotherdimensionissymbolicrepresentationandinter-ethnicaccommodation. Thepresenceofvisibleminority MPsandcouncillorscanenhancetheperceivedlegitimacyofstateinstitutionsintheeyesofmarginalizedcommunities, particularlyinpost-warcontexts(Goodhandetal.,2011\. Reformsthatprotectminoritypartiesfrombeingsqueezedoutbymajoritariandynamicssuchasproportionaltop-upseatsandlowthresholdscanthereforecontributetoconflictmitigation, providedthatpartiesusetheirparliamentarypresencetoadvocateconstructivelyforcompromiseratherthanpolarizingagendas(De Votta,2016\. Insum, theelectoralreformslinkedto19 Ahavelargelypreserved, andinsomerespectsexpanded, opportunitiesforethnicandreligiousminoritiestoobtainparliamentaryandlocalrepresentation. Thedegreetowhichthistranslatesintomeaningfulpolicyinfluencedependsonboundarydesign, coalitionpolitics, andthebroaderclimateofinter-ethnicrelations.4.
  7. 3. Genderandyouthrepresentation Perhapsthemoststrikingrepresentationalchangeinthepost-19 Aerahasoccurredinthedomainofgender, particularlyatlocalgovernmentlevel. Sri Lankalonglaggedbehindrepresentation, withfemale MPsrarelyexceedingfivetosixpercentof Parliament(Kodikara,2012\. Oneofthecriticismsoftheold PRsystemwasthatitdidlittletoincentivizepartiestonominatewomen, especiallyinwinnablepositionsonlists, becausepreference-votecampaignsfavouredwell-resourcedmaleincumbents(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015\. Reformsassociatedwith19A, andthesubsequentlocalgovernmentlegislation, introducedmandatoryquotasforwomeninlocalcouncils. Partiesarenowrequiredtoincludewomeninaspecifiedproportionoftheirnominations,(Kodikara,2017\. Asaresult, thenumberofwomenelectedtolocalauthoritiesincreaseddramaticallyinthefirstelectionsheldunderthenewrules. Whilethischangedoesnotdirectlyalterparliamentaryrepresentation, itcreatesapipelineofexperiencedfemalepoliticianswhomaylatercontestnationalorprovincialseats, therebygraduallytransformingthegenderprofileofhigher-levelinstitutions. Thepictureismoremixedforyouthrepresentation. The-pullingoftenallowedyoungercandidateswithstronglocalfollowingstocompeteeffectively, butitalsodemandedsubstantialfinancialresourcesandpatronagenetworksthatmanyyoungpeoplelacked(Aliff,2012\. Underthemixed-membermodel, constituencycontestsmayfavourmoreestablishedfigures, whilepartylistscouldeitherentrenchseniorelitesorserveaschannelsforpromotingyouthcandidates, dependingoninternalpartydemocracy(Uyangoda,2015\. Somepartieshaverespondedtopublicdemandforrenewalbyplacingyoungercandidatesprominentlyontheirlists, butthistrendisuneven. overnanceanddepoliticizedinstitutionshascreatedadiscursiveenvironmentmoreconducivetoclaimsforinclusiveorganizationshaveusedthelanguageofdemocraticreformtoadvocateforbroaderaccesstocandidacyandleadershippositions(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015; Kodikara,2017\. Theindependent Election Commissionhasalsosupportedawarenesscampaignshighlightingtheimportanceparticipation, althoughitsformalpowerstoregulatepartynominationsremainlimited. Despitetheseadvances, significantchallengesremain. Manynewlyelectedwomencouncillorsreportdifficultiesinaccessingdecision-makingarenasdominatedbymalepartyleaders, andyouthrepresentativesoftenstruggletotranslatetheirvisibilityintoconcretepolicyinfluence(Kodikara,2017; Uyangoda,2015\. Electoralrulesalonecannotovercomeentrenchedpatriarchalnorms, clientelisticnetworks, andhierarchicalpartystructures. Nevertheless, byalteringtheopportunitystructurethroughquotas, listrequirements, andmoretransparentelectionadministrationthepost-19 Areformshavecreatedopeningsforgradualchange. Overall, the Nineteenth Amendmentandrelatedelectoralreformshavehadacomplexbutgenerallypositiveimpactonpoliticalrepresentation. Theyhavemoderatedsomeofthedistortionsandperverseincentivesoftheearlier PRsystem, preservedandinsomeareasenhancedminorityinclusion, andlaidfoundationsforimprovedgenderandyouthrepresentation. Theextenttowhichtheseinstitutionalchangeswilltranslateintodeeperdemocratictransformationwilldependonsustainedpoliticalcommitment, vigilantcivilsocietyengagement, andtheabilityofnewrepresentativestolandscape.
  8. 5. Impactson Governanceand Accountability Thechangesassociatedwiththe Nineteenth Amendmentwereframednotonlyaselectoralengineeringbutaspartofabroaderprojecttoimprovegovernance. Reformersarguedthatrecalibratingtheelectoralsystem, empoweringindependentcommissionsandrevisinglocalgovernmentarrangementswouldstrengthenverticalaccountabilityfromcitizenstorepresentativesandhorizontalaccountabilityamongstateinstitutions(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015; Gamage,2021\. Thissectiondiscussestheimpactofthesereformsinthreeinterrelateddomains: decentralizationandmulti-levelgovernance, accountabilityandtransparency(includingcampaignfinance\, andthebalanceofpowerbetweentheexecutiveandthelegislature. International Journalof Multidisciplinary Researchand Growth Evaluationwww. allmultidisciplinaryjournal. com704|Page5.
  9. 1. Decentralizationandmulti-levelgovernancecentralizationanddemandsforgreaterregionalautonomy. The13th Amendmentintroduced Provincial Councilsasaresponsetoethnicconflict, butfiscalandadministrativecentralizationpersisted, andlocalauthoritiesoftenremainedweakinpractice(Amarasinghe,2010; Uyangoda,2015\. Electoralreformsconnectedtothe Nineteenth Amendmentcontributedtoamodestreconfigurationofthislandscapebystrengtheninglocalrepresentationandclarifyingtherolesofsubnationalbodies. Theintroductionofmixed-memberelectoralarrangementsatlocallevelisparticularlyimportantformulti-levelgovernance. Electingasubstantialproportionofcouncillorsfromsingle-memberwardsgivescommunitiesaclearlyidentifiablerepresentativeresponsibleforlocalissuessuchasinfrastructure, sanitationandsocialwelfare. Atthesame-partysupportisreflectedincouncilcomposition, therebyavoidingtheexclusionofsignificantpoliticalcurrents(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015; Gamage,2015\. Thiscombinationenhancesboththeinputlegitimacy(perceivedeffectivenessofservicedelivery\oflocalauthorities. Theempowermentofthe Election Commissionunder19 Aalsohasadecentralizingdimension. Bymandatingthe Commissiontosupervisevoterregistration, demarcationofwardsandtheconductoflocalelections, theamendmentreducesthepotentialforcentralexecutivemanipulationofsubnationalelectoralprocesses(Edrisinha&Welikala,2008; Welikala,2015\guidelinestopublicofficialssuchaslimitingtheuseofcentralizedstateresourcesforpartisancampaignshelpsensurethatlocalauthoritiesareelectedundermoreequitableconditions, therebystrengtheningtheirlegitimacyvis-?-visbothcitizensandthecentralgovernment. Furthermore, thelocalgovernmentreformsinteractwithexistingprovincialstructures. Although19 Adidnotfundamentallyredesign Provincial Councils, theexpectationisthatmorerepresentativeandaccountablelocalcouncilswilleithercomplementor, insomecases, pressureprovincialandcentralauthoritiestorespondmoreeffectivelytograssrootsneeds(Goodhand, Klem,&S?rb?,2011; Uyangoda,2015\. Forexample, locallyelectedwardcouncillorscanarticulatecommunityconcernsmoreclearlyinprovincialforums, therebyenhancingverticallinkageswithinthestate. Nonetheless, theimpactondecentralizationisconstrainedbypersistentfiscalandadministrativecentralization. Localbodiesoftendependoncentralgrantsandlineministriesformajorprojects, limitingtheirautonomyregardlessofelectoralreforms(Amarasinghe,2010; De Votta,2016\[. Withoutparallelreformsinpublicfinance, civilservicedeploymentandsectoraldevolution, electoralinnovationsalonecannotfullytransformmulti-levelgovernance. Evenso, byimprovingtherepresentativenessandvisibilityoflocalcouncils, thepost-19 Aframeworkcreatesamoresolidfoundationforfuturedecentralizinginitiatives.5.
  10. 2. Accountability, transparencyandcampaignfinance Oneofthecentralgovernanceobjectivesofthe Nineteenth Amendmentwastoenhanceaccountabilityandtransparencyintheelectoralarena. Underthepre-reformarrangement, thecombinationofopen-list PR, multiplepreferentialvotesandweakregulatoryoversightincentivizedhigh-spending, personality-basedcampaigns. Candidatesoftenreliedonprivatefinanciersandthemisuseofstateresources, creatingopportunitiesforcorruptionandpolicycaptureonceinoffice(Aliff,2012; De Votta,2016\. Thestrengthened Election Commissionplaysapivotalroleinaddressingtheseconcerns. Constitutionallyentrenchedunder19A, the Commissionisempoweredtoissuebindingguidelinestopublicofficialsandmediainstitutionsduringelectionperiods, tomonitortheuseofgovernmentpropertyandpersonnel, andtointervenewhenstateresourcesaredeployedinapartisanmanner(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015; Welikala,2015\. Bypublicizingviolationsand, wherepossible, initiatinglegalaction, the Commissioncontributestohorizontalaccountability, constrainingtheabilityofincumbentstotilttheplayingfield. Themovetowardsmixed-memberrepresentationandthecappingofpreferentialvotesalsohaveimplicationsforaccountability. Reducingthenumberofpreferencemarksormovingawayfromopenlistsweakensthefierceintra-partycompetitionthatpreviouslyencouragedcandidatestobuildindividualisticpatronagenetworks. Instead, partiesareincentivizedtocoordinatecampaignsandpresentmorecoherentplatforms, makingiteasierforvoterstoattributeresponsibilityforpolicyoutcomes(Gamage,2015; Reynolds, Reilly,&Ellis,2008\. Constituencyracesfurtherenhanceverticalaccountabilitybyallowingcitizenstorewardorpunishspecific MPsbasedonlocalperformance, ratherthanperceivingthemasanonymousfiguresonadistrict-widelist. However, progressincampaignfinanceregulationhasbeenhaveexpanded, Sri Lankastilllacksafullycomprehensivelegalframeworkthatsetsclearlimitsoncampaignspending, requiresdetaileddisclosureofdonationsandexpenditures, andestablisheseffectivesanctionsfornon-compliance(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015; Uyangoda,2015\. Inpractice, informalfundingnetworkscontinuetoplayamajorrole, andwealthycandidatesorthosewithbusinessbackingretainadvantages. Themixed-membersystemmayactuallyincreasetheimportanceofconstituency-levelspendingifracesarehighlycompetitive, underscoringtheneedforrobustregulation. Transparencyhasnonethelessimprovedincertainareas. Thepressconferencesandpublishedguidelines, havemadeelectoralrulesmorevisibleandunderstandabletocitizens. Civil-societyorganizations, empoweredbythemoreopengovernanceclimateassociatedwith19A, haveintensifiedtheirmonitoringofmediacoverage, campaignconductandtheuseofstateresources(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015; Goodhandetal.,2011\. Thissocietalaccountabilitycomplementsformalinstitutionalmechanisms, creatingreputationalcostsforpartiesthatfloutnormsoffairplay. Inshort, thegovernancegainsassociatedwith19 Ainthedomainofelectoralaccountabilityaresignificantbutincomplete. Strongerindependentoversightandchangesinelectoralincentiveshavereducedsomeofthemostegregiousabusesoftheearlierperiod, yettheabsenceofcomprehensivecampaignfinancelawsandpersistentclientelisticpracticescontinuetolimitthetransformativepotentialofthesereforms(De Votta,2016; Uyangoda,2015\. International Journalof Multidisciplinary Researchand Growth Evaluationwww. allmultidisciplinaryjournal. com705|Page5.
  11. 3. Checksandbalancesandexecutivelegislativerelations Perhapsthemostwidelydiscussedgovernanceimpactofthe Nineteenth Amendmentconcernsitseffectonchecksandbalanceswithintheconstitutionalarchitecture. Priorto19A, thecombinationofanall-powerfulexecutivepresidency, pliantparliamentarymajoritiesandpoliticizedcommissions-. scrutinizetheexecutive, underminedjudicialindependenceandfacilitatedthepoliticizationofelectoraladministration.19 Aaddressedtheseproblemsthroughmultiplemechanisms. Itreintroducedpresidentialtermlimits, curtailedcertainpresidentialpowerssuchastheunfetteredauthoritytodissolve Parliamentandrestoredthe Constitutional Council, taskedwithrecommendingappointmentstoindependentcommissionsandhighjudicialoffices(Edrisinha&Welikala,2008; Welikala,2015\. Bymakingthecompositionofthe Councilpluralisticandincludingnon-partisanmembers, theamendmentsoughttoinsulatekeyinstitutionsfromdirectexecutivecontrol. Forexecutivelegislativerelations, thesechangeshadseveralimplications. First, limitationsonpresidentialdissolutionpowersextendedtheeffectivelifeof Parliamentandincreaseditsbargainingstrength. Governmentsnowhadtomaintainworkingcoalitionsratherthanrelyingsolelyonpresidentialprerogatives, whichintheoryencouragedgreaterconsultationandcompromise(Uyangoda,2015\. Second, therequirementthatthe Presidentactontheadviceofthe Prime Ministerincertainareasshiftedpartofthepoliticalcentreofgravitybacktowardthe Cabinetandthelegislature. Theempowermentofthe Election Commissionisalsocentraltorebalancingrelationsbetweenbranches. Byremovingday-to-daycontrolofelectionsfromtheexecutive, theamendmentcreatedaneutralarbiterthatcanmediatedisputesoverpollingdates, campaignconductandresultcertification. Thisreducesthetemptationforincumbentstomanipulateelectoraltimetablesoradministrativeproceduresforpartisangain, therebystrengtheningthelegitimacyofboth Parliamentandthepresidency(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015; Gamage,2021\. Nevertheless,19 Adidnotfullyresolvetheunderlyingtensionbetweenpresidentialandparliamentaryauthority. Ambiguitiesremainregardingtheprecisedivisionofpowers, especiallyinperiodsofcohabitationwhenthe Presidentandtheparliamentarymajoritybelongtodifferentparties(Amarasinghe,2010; Jayasekara,2016\. Suchsituationscanleadeithertoconstructivepower-sharingortoinstitutionaldeadlock, dependingonthepoliticalcultureandwillingnesstocompromise. Laterconstitutionaldevelopmentshavefurtherillustratedthefragilityofthesearrangements, showingthatformalrulesalonecannotguaranteestablechecksandbalancesintheabsenceofstrongdemocraticnorms(De Votta,2016; Uyangoda,2015\. Fromanaccountabilityperspective, however, thepost-19 Aconfigurationrepresentsarelativeimprovementoverthepre-reformera. Thepresenceofindependentcommissions, includingthe Election Commission, hascreatedadditionaloversightcommittees, thoughstillconstrainedbypartydisciplineandresourcelimitations, operatewithinamoredominanceisnolongerabsolute(Gamage,2021; Welikala,2015\. governanceandaccountabilityoperatesthroughmultiplechannels: enhancedlocalrepresentationwithinamulti-levelstate, strengthenedmechanismsformonitoringelectoralconductandcampaignbehaviour, andarecalibratedbalanceofpowerbetweentheexecutiveandthelegislature. Thesechangeshavenoteliminatedallgovernancepathologiessuchasclientelism, weakcampaignfinanceregulationandpoliticalpolarizationbuttheyhavecreatedamorepluralisticandrule-basedinstitutionalframeworkwithinwhichfurtherdemocraticreformscanbepursued.
  12. 6. Electoral Outcomesunderthe Reformed System Whilethe Nineteenth Amendmentdidnotinstantlyreplacehangedtheenvironmentinwhichsubsequentelectionswereconductedbyempoweringthe Election Commission, revisinglocalauthoritylaws, andsignallingashifttowardamixed-membermodel. Thethreekeypost-19 Aelectionsthe2015parliamentaryelections, the2018localgovernmentelectionsunderthenewmixedsystem, andthe2020parliamentaryelectionstogetherillustrateboththepotentialandlimitsofthesereformsforreshapingpoliticalcompetitionanddemocraticgovernance.6.
  13. 1. The2015parliamentaryelections Theparliamentaryelectionof17 August2015wasthefirstnationalpollheldaftertheadoptionofthe Nineteenth Amendmentin April
  14. 2015. Althoughthebasicproportionalrepresentation(PR\systemwithpreferentialvotingremainedinplace,19 Ahadalreadyalteredtheinstitutionalcontextbyrestoringthe Constitutional Councilandstrengtheningthelegalbasisforanindependent Election Commission, eventhoughthenew Commissionitselfwasestablishedlater(Amarasinghe,2010; Welikala,2015\. Theelectionfollowedthesurprisepresidentialvictoryof Maithripala Sirisenain January2015, whichfracturedthe(UPFA\andproducedanunstablecohabitationbetweenreformistandconservativefactions(De Votta,2016\.-corruptionandconstitutionalreform, reflectingtheagendathathaddriventheadoptionof19A. Inelectoralterms, the United National Frontfor Good Governance(UNFGG\, ledby Ranil Wickremesinghe, becamethelargestblocin Parliamentwith106seats, whilethe UPFAsecured95seats. The Tamil National Alliance(TNA\won16seats, consolidatingitspositionasthemainrepresentativeof Sri Lankan Tamils, andthe Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna(JVP\obtained6seatsasaleftistoppositionforce. Smallerparties, includingthe Sri Lankasharedtheremainingseats. Voterturnoutwashighataround78percent, indicatingcontinuedpublicengagementdespitepoliticalturbulence. Theoutcomeproducedahung Parliament, withthe UNFGGshortofanoutrightmajority. Ratherthanrevertingtoconfrontationalpolitics, anationalgovernmentwasformedwhenasectionofthe Sri Lanka Freedom Party(SLFP\agreedtosupport Wickremesingheasprimeminister. Thisarrangementreflectedthenewbalancecreatedby19A: apresidencyconstrainedbytermlimitsandsubjecttogreaterparliamentaryoversight, andalegislaturethathadtofunction International Journalof Multidisciplinary Researchand Growth Evaluationwww. allmultidisciplinaryjournal. com706|Pagethroughcoalitionandcompromise(Uyangoda,2015; Welikala,2015\. Fromarepresentationalstandpoint, the2015electiondisplayedbothcontinuityandincrementalchange. The PRsystemstillproducedarelativelyproportionalseatdistribution, allowingminorityandsmallerpartiestobepresentin Parliament. However, patternsofpersonalizedcampaigning, preferential-votecompetitionandpatronagepersisted, revealingthatthecoreincentivesoftheoldelectoraldesignhadnotyetbeenstructurallyaltered(Aliff,2012; De Votta,2016\. Themaininnovationsassociatedwith19 Aatthisstagewerethusinstitutionalratherthanmechanical: astrongerframeworkforindependentelectoraladministrationandarenewednormativeemphasisonaccountabilityandcoalitiongovernance.6.
  15. 2. Localgovernmentelectionsof2018 Thelocalgovernmentelectionsheldon10 February2018markedthefirstlarge-scaletestofthemixed-membermodelinthepost-19 Areformcycle. Underthe Local Authorities Elections(Amendment\Acts, localcouncilswereelectedthrougha60:40formula, with60percentofmemberschosenfromsingle-memberwardsusingfirst-past-the-postvotingand40percentfromclosedpartylistsallocatedproportionally(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015\. Astatutory25percentquotaforwomenwasalsointroduced, primarilyimplementedviathe PRcomponent(Kodikara,2017\. Theelectionwasoneofthelargestin Sri Lankroughly8,300councillorswereelectedto340341localauthorities, withturnoutcloseto80percent. Politically, themoststrikingoutcomewastheemergenceofthe Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna(SLPP\anewpartyalignedwithformerpresident Mahinda Rajapaksaastheclearwinner. The SLPPobtainedabout4041percentofthenationalvote, over3,400councillorsandcontrolofmorethantwo-thirdsoflocalbodies, dramaticallyoutperformingboththe UNFGG/UNFandthe UPFA(Peiris,2018\. Theseresultshadseveralimplicationsfortheassessmentofelectoralreform:
  16. 1. Mechanicalandpsychologicaleffectsofthemixedsystem Theward-based FPTPtierallowedthe SLPP, whosesupportwasterritoriallyconcentratedandhighlymobilized, toconvertvotesintoalargenumberofwardvictories. Theproportionallisttierensuredthatoppositionparties, particularlythe United National Frontandregionalminorityparties, stillobtainedrepresentationeveninareaswheretheywerenotwinningwards(Reynolds, Reilly,&Ellis,2008\. Thehighincidenceofhungcouncilsnearly200localauthoritieswithoutsingle-partymajoritiesshowedthatthemixedsystemproducedfragmentedlocallandscapesrequiringcoalition-buildingandnegotiation.
  17. 2. Impactongovernanceandpartycompetitionareferendumonthenationalcoalitiongovernment, exposingpublicfrustrationswitheconomicperformanceandintra-coalitionconflict(De Votta,2016; Peiris,2018\. Atthesametime, therequirementtoformcoalitionsinmanycouncilsforcedpartiestoengageinlocal-levelbargaining, sometimescrossingethnicandpartisanlinesandtherebydeepeningmulti-levelgovernancedynamics.
  18. 3. Genderrepresentationlocalgovernment: forthefirsttime, womencameclosetoonequarteroflocalcouncillors, adramaticincreasefromprevioussingle-digitlevels(Gunasekera,2023; Kodikara,2017\. Subsequentresearch, however, indicatesthatmanyofthesewomenfacedobstaclessuchaslimitedaccesstoleadershippositions, party-levelmarginalizationandpersistentpatriarchalattitudes, illustratingthatquotasarenecessarybutnotsufficientforsubstantivegenderequality(Gunasekera,2023; UNFPA,2025\. Fromthevantagepointof19A, the2018localelectionsconfirmedthatmixed-memberrulesandquotascanreshapethedescriptiveprofileoflocalcouncilsandre-energizeterritorialrepresentation, butalsothatelectoralengineeringcannotbyitselfresolvedeeperissuesofcoalitioninstability, elitepolarizationandsocio-economicdiscontent.6.
  19. 3. The2020parliamentaryelections Theparliamentaryelectionof5 August2020tookplaceinacontextverydifferentfrom
  20. 2015. Sri Lankahadenduredthe Easter Sundayterroristattacksin2019andwasgrapplingwiththeearlystagesofthe COVID-19pandemic. Politically, the Rajapaksafamilyhadreturnedtoprominence: Gotabaya Rajapaksawonthepresidencyin November2019, and Mahinda Rajapaksawasappointedprimeminister. Althoughthecoreparliamentaryelectoralsystemremainedthe PRmodelintroducedin1978, theinstitutionalframeworkinheritedfrom19 Astillapplied: the Election Commissionorganizedthepoll, supervisedhealth-relatedadaptations, andsoughttomaintainalevelplayingfielddespiteintensepartisanpolarization(Gamage,2021\. Officialresultseedom Alliance(SLPFA\analliancedominatedbythe SLPPobtainedabout59percentofthevoteand145ofthe225seats, gaininganeartwo-thirdsmajorityin Parliament. Thenewlyformed Samagi Jana Balawegaya(SJB\emergedasthemainoppositionwith54seats, whilethe TNAwasreducedto10once-dominant United National Party(UNP\wasreducedtoasingleseat. Turnoutremainedhighatroughly76percent. Theseoutcomeshighlightseveralfeaturesofthepost-19 Aelectorallandscape:
  21. 1. Concentrationofpowerdespiteformalsafeguardssystemwithindependentelectoraladministration, asufficientlypopularpartycanobtainacommandingparliamentarymajority. Thismajorityenabledthegovernmenttorapidlypursuefurtherconstitutionalchangesmostnotablythe Twentieth Amendmentwhichrolledbackseveralconstraintsonpresidentialpowerintroducedby19A(De Votta,2016; Gamage,2021\. International Journalof Multidisciplinary Researchand Growth Evaluationwww. allmultidisciplinaryjournal. com707|Page
  22. 2. Partysystemrealignment Thenear-collapseofthe UNPandtheriseofboththe SLPP/SLPFAandthe SJBsignalledaprofoundrestructuringofpartycompetition, withnewformationsreplacingolderalignmentsratherthanasimplealternationbetweentraditionalparties. Theelectoralsystem, withitsnationwide PRcomponentandmodestthresholds, facilitatedthisrealignmentbyallowingnewpartiestoconverttheirsupportintosubstantialparliamentaryblocsrelativelyquickly.
  23. 3. Representationandoppositioncapacity Minority-orientedparties, particularlythe TNA, experiencedreducedrepresentation, reflectingchangingvoterpreferencesandtheimpactofnewmajority-orientednarrativesaftertheendofthecivilwar. Nonetheless, thepresenceof SJB, NPPandregionalpartiesensuredthat Parliamentretainedpluralism, evenifoppositiongroupsfacedstructuraldisadvantagesagainstagovernmentwithconstitutional-amendment-levelstrength. Fromanaccountabilityperspective, the2020electionunderscoresanimportantlesson: institutionalreformslike19 Acancreatefairerproceduresandmoreindependentelectoraladministration, buttheycannotpredetermineelectoraloutcomes. Whenagoverningcoalitionenjoysbroadpublicsupport, itcanusethoseveryinstitutionstolegitimizeanddeepenitspower. Theresilienceofdemocraticchecksandbalancesthereforedependsnotonlyonelectoralrulesbutalsoonthewillingnessofpoliticalactorstorespectconstitutionallimitsandonthecapacityofcivilsociety, courtsandthemediatoscrutinizetheexerciseofpower. Takentogether, the2015,2018and2020electionsrevealacomplexpicture. Thereformsassociatedwiththe Nineteenth Amendmentimprovedtheintegrityandinclusivenessofelectoralprocessesespeciallythroughindependentoversightandmixed-memberrulesatthelocallevelyettheyalsocoexistedwithstrongmajoritarianimpulsesandconstitutionaldevelopmentwilldeterminewhethertheseproceduralgainscanbeconsolidatedintoamoredurablecultureofdemocraticaccountabilityandbalancedrepresentation.
  24. 7. Challenges, Critiquesand Implementation Gaps Althoughthe Nineteenth Amendmentandrelatedelectoralreformswerewidelywelcomedasademocraticbreakthrough, theirimplementationhasbeenunevenandcontested. Themovetowardsamixed-membersystem, thecappingofpreferentialvotes, andthestrengtheningofthe Election Commissionallconfrontedentrenchedpoliticalinterests, legalambiguitiesandpublicmisunderstanding. Thissectionreviewsthreebroadsetsofdifficulties: politicalresistanceandinstitutionalinertia, legalandadministrativechallenges, andissuesofvotereducationandpublicperceptions.7.
  25. 1. Politicalresistanceandinstitutionalinertia Electoralsystemsshapewhowinsandwholoses; therefore, theactorswhobenefitedfromthepreviousarrangementswereoftenreluctanttoembracechange. In Sri Lanka, many MPsandlocalpoliticianshadbuilttheircareersunderdistrict-levelproportionalrepresentationandpreferentialvoting, developingclientelistnetworksandpersonalvotebasesthatmightbeweakenedbyashifttosingle-memberconstituenciesandreducedpreferentialcompetition(Aliff,2012; De Votta,2016\. Forthesepoliticians, theproposedmixed-membermodelthreatenedexistingpowerstructuresinsidepartiesaswellasbetweenparties. Withinmajorpoliticalorganizations, intra-partyresistancemanifestedinseveralways. Somepartyelitesacceptedtheprincipleofreformbutsoughttoinfluencethedesigndetailssuchastheratioofconstituencytolistseatsorthedrawingofboundariesinwaysthatwouldprotecttheirownelectoralprospects(Gamage,2015; Welikala,2015\. Othersusedproceduraltacticstodelaylegislationortopostponethefullapplicationofreforms, particularlyatparliamentarylevel. Evenaftertheadoptionof19A, bargainingoverthepreciseformulaandtimingofthemixed-membersystemcontinued, revealinghowformalconstitutionalcommitmentscanbedilutedthrougheverydaypoliticalnegotiations(Gamage,2021\. Institutionalinertiaalsoplayedarole. Publicadministrativebodiesaccustomedtooperatingundertheoldelectoralrulesweresometimeshesitanttoadapttonewprocedures. Delimitationexercisesrequiredthecooperationofmultipleministriesandagencies, includingthoseresponsibleforlandrecords, populationdataandlocaladministration. Wherecoordinationwasweakorbureaucraticincentivesweremisaligned, technicalprocessesstalled, creatinggroundsforpoliticalactorstoquestionorcontesttheoutputs(Amarasinghe,2010; Uyangoda,2015\. Moreover, thesubsequentconstitutionaltrajectorycomfortableparliamentarymajorityobtainedbytherulingalliancein2020enabledtheadoptionoffurtherconstitutionalchangesthatrolledbacksomechecksonpresidentialpowerandalteredthebalancecarefullycraftedin2015(De Votta,2016; Gamage,2021\. Thisillustratedakeycritique: thatwhile19 Acreatedimportantinstitutionalguardrails, itdidnotfundamentallytransformthecompetitivelogicof Sri Lankanpolitics, wherepartiesstillseektouseconstitutionalamendmentsasinstrumentsinpowerstruggles. Inshort, politicalresistanceandinstitutionalinertialimitedthespeedanddepthwithwhichelectoralreformscouldberealized. Theexistenceofcross-partyconsensusonprinciplesofreformdidnotalwaystranslateintosustainedsupportforspecificdesignchoices, especiallywhenthesethreatenedtheinterestsofpowerfulincumbents.7.
  26. 2. Legalandadministrativechallengesencounteredarangeoflegalandadministrativedifficulties. Theamendmentitselfsetoutbroadconstitutionalprinciplessuchastheindependentstatusofthe Election Commissionandthecommitmenttoamixedelectoralmodelbutrequiredsupplementaryordinarylegislationtooperationalizethesecommitmentsforparliamentary, provincialandlocalgovernmentelections(Welikala,2015\. Drafting, debatingandenactingtheselawsprovedcomplexandtime-consuming. Onemajorchallengewasdelimitation. Theshifttowardssingle-memberwardsandsmallerconstituenciesrequiredacompleteredrawingofelectoralboundaries. Delimitationcommissionsneededtobalancemultiplecriteriapopulationequality, geography, administrativeconvenience, community International Journalof Multidisciplinary Researchand Growth Evaluationwww. allmultidisciplinaryjournal. com708|Pagetiesandminorityprotectionwhileavoidingaccusationsofpartisangerrymandering(Nohlen,2005; Reynolds, Reilly,&Ellis,2008\. Inpractice, theirreportswerefrequentlycontestedbypartiesandlocalstakeholders, leadingtorevisions, courtchallengesandpoliticalbargainingthatdelayedimplementation(Gamage,2015\. Administrativecapacityconstraintsfurthercomplicatedmatters. The Election Commission, althoughconstitutionallyempowered, hadtooverseenewtaskssuchasmanagingmixed-memberballots, trainingpollingofficialsonrevisedcountingprocedures, andeducatingpartyagentsandobserversaboutthenewrules(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015\. Localgovernmentofficials, manyofwhomhadoperatedfordecadesundertheoldsystem, requiredsubstantialreorientationtounderstandhowwardrepresentat-incouncilcomposition. Limitedfinancialandhumanresources, particularlyinruralareas, stretchedadministrativesystemsthatwerealreadyburdenedbyroutineelectoralduties(Amarasinghe,2010; Uyangoda,2015\. Legalambiguitiesalsogenerateddisputes. Thecoexistenceofmultipleconstitutionalamendmentsandelectionlawssomepredating19 Acreatedoverlappingandsometimesconflictingprovisions. Forexample, clarifyingtherespectivepowersofthe President, the Cabinetandthe Election Commissioninsettingelectiondatesbecamecontentiousinsituationswhere Parliamenthadbeendissolvedorpublichealthemergencies(suchasthe COVID-19pandemic\requiredpostponementofpolls(Gamage,2021\. Whilecourtsprovidedsomeguidance, litigationitselfcauseduncertaintyandgavepoliticalactorsopportunitiestoquestiontheimpartialityofinstitutions. Atlocallevel, theexperimentwithmixed-memberrulesandgenderquotasrevealedoperationalchallengesthathadnotbeenfullyanticipated. Theallocationofseatsunderthe60:40formula, particularlyincouncilswithfragmentedvotedistributions, provedmathematicallycomplex. Errorsordelaysintabulatingresultsnotonlyfrustratedpartiesandcandidatesbutalsoopenedthe Commissiontocriticism, evenwhenproblemsarosefromlegalformulaeadoptedby Parliamentratherthanfromadministrativenegligence(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015; Kodikara,2017\. Thus, while19 Aprovidedastrongnormativeandconstitutionalframework, thetranslationofthatframeworkintoeffectiveelectoralpracticedemandedlegalclarity, technicalexpertiseandadministrativeresourcesthatwerenotalwaysconsistentlyavailable.7.
  27. 3. Votereducationandpublicperceptions Afurthersetofimplementationgapsconcernsvotereducationandpublicperceptions. Electoralreformscanonlyachievetheirdemocraticobjectivesifcitizensunderstandthenewrules, trusttheinstitutionsthatadministerthem, andbelievethattheirparticipationwillmakeadifference(Reynoldsetal.,2008\. In Sri Lanka, publicawarenessofbecamewidelyknownduringthe2015reformmoment(De Votta,2016; Uyangoda,2015\. Themixed-membermodelusedinlocalgovernmentelections, forinstance, introducednewconceptssuchasward-quotaforwomen. Manyvotersstruggledtograsphowtheirvotesinawardracewouldinteractwithpartylistallocationstodeterminethefinalcompositionofcouncils(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015; Kodikara,2017\. Misunderstandingsalsoaroseabouttheroleofwomenelectedthroughthequota; somemembersofthepublic, and-representatives, underminingthesymbolicandsubstantiveimpactofthereform(Kodikara,2017\. The Election Commissionlaunchedvotereducationcampaignsthroughmediaannouncements, postersandoutreachprogramstoexplainthenewsystem. Civil-societyorganizationscomplementedtheseeffortsbyconductingworkshopsandproducingsimplifiedguides. However, thescaleofchangeandthediversityoflocalcontextsmeantthatmessagesdidnotalwaysreachallcommunities, especiallyinremoteareasoramongmarginalizedgroups(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015\. Literacylevels, languagebarriersanddistrustofpoliticalactorsfurtherconstrainedtheeffectivenessofcommunicationstrategies(Goodhand, Klem,&S?rb?,2011\. Publicperceptionswerealsoshapedbybroaderpoliticaldevelopments. Theinitialoptimismsurrounding19 Awastemperedbysubsequentconstitutionalreversalsandpoliticalcrises, leadingsomecitizenstoviewreformsaselitemaneuversratherthandurableguaranteesoftheirrights(De Votta,2016; Gamage,2021\. Whenlateramendmentsappearedtoundopartsofthe19 Asettlement, scepticismgrewaboutwhetherindependentcommissionsandrevisedelectoralrulescouldwithstandthepressuresofmajoritarianpolitics. Thisscepticisminturnaffectedhowvotersinterpretedeachnewchange: ratherthanseeingthemixed-membersystemandquotasasneutraltechnicalimprovements, theyweresometimesframedasstrategiestofavourparticularpartiesorleaders. Anotherchallengeisthepersistenceofclientelisticexpectations. Inmanyconstituencies, voterscontinuetoassessrepresentativeslessonpolicyperformanceandmoreontheirabilitytodeliverindividualbenefits, jobsorlocalprojects(Manor,1989; Uyangoda,2015\. Evenwhenelectoralreformscreatestructuresforprogrammaticcompetitionandconstituencyaccountability, theseexpectationscanencouragecandidatestomaintainpatronage-basedcampaignstyles, limitingthetransformativepotentialofinstitutionalchange. Forinstance, somewardcouncillorselectedunderthenewlocalrulescontinuetorelyheavilyonpersonalizednetworksratherthanpartyplatforms, blurringtheintendeddistinctionbetweenindividualandparty-basedrepresentation. Despitetheseobstacles, therearesignsofgradualchangeinpublicattitudes. Surveysandqualitativestudiessuggestthatcitizensincreasinglyvaluefairprocedures, transparentcountingandimpartialadministration, especiallyafterexperiencesofviolenceandmalpracticeinearlierelections(Goodhandetal.,2011; Uyangoda,2015\. Thevisibleroleofthe Election Commissionthroughpressconferences, guidelinesandenforcementactionshascontributedtoperceptionsthatelectionsaremoreprofessionallymanaged, evenwhenvotersremaincriticalofpoliticiansthemselves. Youthactihavealsousedthelanguageofconstitutionalrightsandelectoralfairnesstodemanddeeperreforms, indicatingthat19 Ahashadabroaderpedagogicaleffectinthepoliticalculture(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015; Kodikara,2017\. Insum, votereducationandpublicperceptionsrepresenta International Journalof Multidisciplinary Researchand Growth Evaluationwww. allmultidisciplinaryjournal. com709|Pagecrucialfrontierforconsolidatingthegainsof19A. Withoutsustainedeffortstoexplaincomplexreforms, buildtrustininstitutionsandchallengeclientelistnorms, evenwell-designedelectoralsystemswillfallshortoftheirdemocraticpromise. Theexperienceof Sri Lankaunderscoresthatconstitutionalandlegalchangemustbeaccompaniedbylong-termcivicengagementandpoliticallearningifelectoralreformsaretotranslateintogenuinelyaccountableandparticipatorygovernance.
  28. 8. Comparative Perspectivesand Future Reform Agenda8.
  29. 1. Lessonsfromother MMPandhybridsystems-membermodel, asenvisagedunderthe Nineteenth Amendmentandimplementedmostclearlyatlocallevel, canbebetterunderstoodbycomparingitwithothercountriesthatusemixed-memberproportional(MMP\orhybridsystems. Comparativeexperienceconfirmsthatmixedsystemscansuccessfullycombineconstituencyrepresentationwithoverallproportionality, butalsoshowsthatdetaileddesignchoicessuchastheratioofconstituencytolistseats, thresholds, andoverhangmechanismsarecrucialfordemocraticoutcomes(Lijphart,1999; Reynolds, Reilly,&Ellis,2008; Shugart&Wattenberg,2001\.-standing MMPsystemisoftencitedasthearchetype. Voterscasttwoballots: oneforaconstituencycandidateandoneforapartylist. Thefinalpartisancompositionofthe Bundestagisdeterminedprimarilybythewinsmoreconstituenciesthanitsproportionalshare, andproportionality(Shugart&Wattenberg,2001\. Thisdesignhasproducedrelativelystablemulti-partycoalitionsandahighdegreeofproportionality, whilemaintainingstrongconstituencylinksbetween MPsandvoters(Norris,2011\. New Zealandoffersanotherinstructiveexample. Theadoptionof MMPin1993wasdrivenbydissatisfactionwiththedisproportionaloutcomesofitsfirst-past-the-postsystem. The New Zealandmodelalsousesatwo-votesystem, withapproximatelyhalfof MPselectedfromsingle-memberconstituenciesandtheremainderfrompartylists(Vowles,2013\. Thechangeledtomoreinclusiverepresentationof-partytocoalitiongovernments, andenhancedscrutinyofexecutivepower(Boston, Levine, Mc Leay,&Roberts,1996\. Atthesametime, New Zealandhashadtomanagechallengessuchaspartyfragmentationandpublicconfusionabouttherelationshipbetweenelectorateandlist MPs. Otherhybridsystemsillustrateadditionaldesigntrade-offs.-1994electoralsystemcombinessingle-memberdistrictswithaseparateproportionaltier, butwithlimitedcompensationbetweenthetwocomponents, producingamixed-membermajoritarianratherthanproportionaloutcome(Reynoldsetal.,2008\. Thisarrangementhaspreserveddominancebylargepartieswhileofferingsomespaceforsmallerpartiesintheproportionaltier. Similarly, Mexicoand South Koreausemixedsystemsthatretainsignificantmajoritarianbias, indicatingthatmixed-memberformulasdonotautomaticallyguaranteeproportionalityandthatpoliticalelitescansteerreformstoprotectincumbentadvantages(Nohlen,2005; Norris,2011\. Severallessonsemergefromtheseexperiencesfor Sri Lanka. First, clarityofthecompensatorymechanismisessential. Systemsthatexplicitlytiethedistributionoflistseatstothenationalorregionalpartyvote, asin Germanyand New Zealand, aremorelikelytoproduceproportionaloutcomes1999; Shugart&Wattenberg,2001\. Second, reasonablethresholdstypicallybetween3and5percentofthelistvotehelpbalancepartysystemfragmentationwithrepresentationalfairness. Verylowthresholdscanencourageexcessivepartyproliferation, whileveryhighthresholdscanexcludesignificantminorities(Reynoldsetal.,2008\. Third, comparativeevidencehighlightsthevalueofgenderandminorityinclusionmechanisms. New Zealand, Scotlandand Waleshaveusedpartyquotasandliststrategiestoratehowlistplacementrulescanpromotedescriptivediversity(Norris,2004; Krook,2009\ofquotasinlocalgovernmentandsuggestthatsimilartoolscouldbeadaptedforparliamentaryandprovincialtiers. Finally, comparativesystemsunderscorethatmixed-memberreformsaremosteffectivewhenaccompaniedbyrobustindependentelectoralmanagementandcampaignfinance-partisanelectionadministrationandstrictcontrolsonpartyfundinghavehelpedsustainpublicconfidenceintheintegrityofelections(Norris,2015\rulesperformsimilarfunctions. For Sri Lanka, thestrengthened Election Commissionunder19 Aprovidesaninstitutionalplatform, butfurtherlegalandadministrativedevelopmentisnecessarytomatchthesestandards(Gamage,2021; Welikala,2015\. Overall, other MMPandhybridsystemsconfirmthat Sriwithglobaltrendstowardcombiningproportionalitywithconstituencyrepresentation, buttheyalsohighlightthatthesuccessofsuchreformsdependsoncarefultechnicaldesignandsupportivepoliticalandlegalframeworks.8.2 Policyrecommendationsfordeepeningdemocraticgainslessons, severalpolicydirectionscanbeidentifiedtodeepenthedemocraticgainsassociatedwiththe Nineteenth Amendment. First, Sri Lankashouldcompleteandrefinethemixed-memberdesignatparliamentaryandprovinciallevels. Thisincludesclearlyspecifyingtheratioofconstituencytolistseats, adoptingatransparentcompensatoryformulathattiesoverallseatallocationtothenationalorprovincialpartyvote, andintroducingmechanismstoaddressoverhangseats. Atwo-votesystem, inwhichvoterscanseparatelychooseaconstituencycandidateandaparty, wouldenhancevoterchoiceandstrengthenthelinkbetweenelectoraloutcomesandpartysupport(Reynoldsetal.,2008; Shugart&Wattenberg,2001\. Second, reformsshouldconsolidateandextendinclusionlocalgovernmentsuggeststhatreservedproportionsofwomenonpartylfemalecandidatescouldbeconsideredforparliamentaryelections(Kodikara,2017; Krook,2009\. Similartoolscouldbedesignedtosecurerepresentationforhistoricallymarginalizedethnicandreligiouscommunities, either International Journalof Multidisciplinary Researchand Growth Evaluationwww. allmultidisciplinaryjournal. com710|Pagethroughlistplacementrulesorreservedseatsinconstituencieswheresuchgroupsareconcentrated(Goodhand, Klem,&S?rb?,2011\. Third, thereisastrongcaseforcomprehensivecampaignfinancelegislation. Independentoversightalonecannotcurbtheinfluenceofmoneywithoutclearstatutorylimitsondonationsandexpenditures, robustdisclosurerequirements, andeffectivesanctionsforviolations(Norris,2015\. Atransparentregimemonitoredbythe Election Commissionincollaborationwiththe Auditor Generalandcivil-societywatchdogswouldhelpreduceclientelismandleveltheplayingfieldbetweenincumbentsandchallengers(Centrefor Policy Alternatives,2015\. Fourth, Sri Lankashouldfurtherinstitutionalizetheindependenceandcapacityofthe Election Commission. Thiscouldincludeconstitutionalentrenchmentofkeypowers, multi-yearbudgetaryguarantees, andclearcriteriafortheappointment, tenureandremovalofcommissioners(Edrisinha&Welikala,2008; Welikala,2015\. wouldalsoenhanceitsabilitytomanagecomplexmixed-memberelections, undertakeboundarydelimitation, andconductvotereducationcampaigns. Fifth, long-termsuccessrequiresinvestmentincivicandvotereducation. Systematicprogramsinschools, universitiesandcommunityorganizationscanhelpcitizensunderstandthelogicofmixed-memberrepresentation, therolesofconstituencyandlist MPs, andtheimportanceofprogrammaticvotingoverpatronage-basedexpectations(Uyangoda,2015\. Partnershipsbetweenthe Election Commission, mediaandcivilsocietycanfacilitateaccessibleexplanationsofelectoralrulesinallnationallanguagesandtailormaterialstodifferentregionsandsocialgroups. Finally, anyfutureconstitutionalreformsshouldseektoprotectthecoredemocraticsafeguardsintroducedby19A, includingindependentcommissionsandbalancedexecutivelegislativerelations. Thismayinvolveraisingamendmentthresholdsforprovisionsrelatingtotheelectoralsystemandtheindependenceofkeyinstitutions, orrequiringspecialproceduressuchasreferendumsforchangesthatsignificantlyaffecttheelectoralplayingfield(De Votta,2016; Gamage,2021\. partialmovetoamixed-memberframeworkanditsreinforcementofindependentelectoraladministrationarestepsintherightdirection, butnottheendofthereformjourney. Byrefiningthetechnicaldesignofthesystem, enhancinginclusion, regulatingcampaignfinance, strengtheninginstitutionsandinvestinginciviceducation, policy-makersandcitizenscantransformtheproceduralgainsofthe Nineteenth Amendmentintodeeper, moreresilientdemocraticconsolidation. References
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Publication Information

Journal: International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Growth Evaluation (IJMRGE)

Publisher: Anfo Publication House

ISSN: 2582-7138 (Online)

Frequency: Bimonthly

Language: English

Open Access: Yes - This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

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